

# PSYCHE AND EROS

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*Editors:*

PROF. CHARLES BAUDOUIN, *Geneva*

HERBERT SILBERER, *Vienna*

WILHELM STEKEL, M.D., *Vienna*

SAMUEL A. TANNENBAUM, M.D., *New York*

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## LIST OF ERRATA

Cover 2, line 20. For *Neber* read *Ueber*

Page 194, line 34. For *live*, read *live*.

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| " 195, | " 1.  | "       | <i>dream experience, he feels driven to the</i><br><i>read this, he cannot doubt the reality of</i> |
| " 200, | " 29. | "       | <i>n</i> read <i>in</i>   |
| " 201, | " 3.  | "       | <i>ti</i> read <i>to</i>  |
| " 204, | " 40. | "       | <i>emphaise</i> read <i>emphasise</i>   |
| " 234, | " 37. | "       | <i>analysts</i> read <i>analyst's</i>   |
| " 194, | " 33, | col. 2. | For <i>wit</i> ; read <i>wit</i> :  |
| " 195, | " 3,  | "       | " <i>accomplish</i> read <i>accomplish</i> ,  |
| " 196, | " 4,  | "       | " <i>shelte</i> read <i>shelter</i>   |
| " 198, | " 5,  | "       | " <i>matter</i> read <i>matter</i> ,  |
| " 200, | " 28, | "       | " <i>hidding</i> read <i>hiding</i>   |
| " "    | " 35, | "       | " <i>closly</i> read <i>closely</i>   |
| " "    | " 38, | "       | " <i>haw</i> read <i>how</i>  |
| " 201, | " 23, | "       | " <i>case</i> read <i>cases</i>   |
| " 222, | " 23, | col. 1. | " <i>containng</i> read <i>containing</i>   |
| " 245, | " 41, | col. 2. | " <i>deailed</i> read <i>detailed</i>   |
| " 253, | " 25, | "       | " <i>right-minded</i> read <i>right-handed</i>  |







# PSYCHE AND EROS

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## Dreams, Superstition and Neuroses

By J. Marcinowski, M.D.,

*Bad-Heilbrunn*

It is surely one of the most fascinating aspects of analytical psychology that it furnishes us not only data about the inner facts of our own psychic life and that it opens up to us the understanding of the psychic life of individual mankind but that it is, at the same time, also a key to the occurrences in the cultural history of mankind as a whole, and that by its aid we get more and deeper insights than are yielded by any other mode of investigation.

Because of his psychoanalytic findings Freud characterized compulsion neuroses as a caricature of religion, inasmuch as he had discovered connections between compulsive ceremonies, a form of neurosis with which we physicians are quite familiar, and religious cults—and those not merely of the past. But therewith the origin of religion, and more especially the inner structure of religion became a fruitful field for analytical psychology. In this way we finally learned how better to understand the one from our study of the other, and vice versa,—religion as such and also certain forms of nervousness; and all through our daily analyses there constantly keep cropping up new

links between these two subjects. I may therefore be permitted to lay before the reader in a sketchy way a particularly interesting fragment of such reflections.

Inasmuch as in the neuroses which we physicians are called upon to treat, ideas of guilt play a great rôle and also lead to all sorts of penitential and repentance symbolisms in the ceremonials of the compulsion neurotic, it is extremely important to study the souls of our patients with reference to all sorts of superstitious elements. This must be carried out with great care for we run the risk of encroaching on genuine religious piety—touch which we physicians have no right.

But it is an open question whether in these cases it is really a matter of genuine piety; for very much that is neurotic conceals itself behind a cloak of religious formulas, and there are innumerable pseudo-religious conflicts which have, strictly speaking, nothing more in common with religion than the phraseology employed. To call a halt before these would be a very unscientific and unpsychological capitulation and a renunciation of a therapeutic resource which would mean a want of medical skill in

penetrating the problem, just exactly as it would frequently be erroneous for a spiritual healer to mistake such a pseudo-religious conflict for a genuine religious conflict and to attack with priestly methods a conflict having such a very different content.

But aside from these complicated cases we are really dealing with fundamental facts that may be of equal importance to all mankind, e. g., *the problem of the origin of the superstitious belief in ghosts and its elaboration in the course of cultural evolution*. As a result of my experiences I would say that *the belief in ghosts and various magical cults emanate from the misunderstood dream life of humanity*. How did superstition and magic originate? From what sources do these ideas emanate? How was it even possible for them to develop? How could humanity—or rather how it was compelled to—fall into them, and into what shapes did they subsequently develop? And, finally, how do their last offshoots in our time look?

Most studies of this subject proceed from the idea that mankind owes its ghost-belief to the problem of death. From this unpleasant fact—of the final limitedness of our earthly existence—there resulted, as a wish-fulfilling fantasy, the belief that departed spirits continued to live. I shall not deny that civilized man of somewhat later times *could* have reached such an idea in this way. But it would certainly require us to overlook certain necessary intervening links, nay, to overleap them, if we were to assume that *primitive* man too could originally have come to such peculiar results by means of such reflections. Dreams supply us with the bridge to this road; in them do we first find the pro-

totypes which man had to have ere it was possible for him to conceive the idea of ghostly existence. And if we examine certain dreams in which the persons re-appear to us even many years after their death, I am inclined to believe that we have been compelled by just such dream experiences to develop such views as we to-day catalogue as superstitions.

The dream-experience is characterized, as we know, by an affective want of the critical faculty, that is to say: what we experience in a dream has the value of realities for us as long as we are dreaming. That was not always so, and even to-day there are primitive peoples—I am thinking, for example, of K. v. D. Strinen's studies among the Indian tribes of the Brazilian forests—for whom the dream-experiences have a value even among their waking realities. The Bakairi also acts in his dreams, and on awaking looks on it as a real achievement. He takes his dream-content for reality and so misunderstands its really figurative significance. If he now compares the achievements experienced in his dreams with those of his waking body, he cannot help getting the idea that his achievements in dreams are even by far greater and more extensive than those performed in his waking state. But still another thing impresses itself on his mind, to wit; the contradiction between his dream experience and the state of his body during sleep. Let us study this in a simple example:—A man who had been asleep awakes and says that during the night he had been hunting high up in the mountains and had brought down a bear. But his brother, who had been sitting by the campfire all night, assures him he had been sleeping quietly on the mat all night. But since, notwithstanding

dream-experience, he feels driven to the further assumption that there is living in him something that can leave his body and then return to it, and that this something—let us call it the dream-soul—is capable of achieving more when it is outside that body which it, so to say, only inhabits. Thus he comes at the same time to an understanding of sleeping and waking: man sleeps when his dream-soul leaves the body; he awakes when it comes back to it,—a theory which, as we know, has resulted in the precautionary measure never to awake a person suddenly from his sleep, for his soul might possibly be so far away that it could not come back quickly enough—and that might, under certain circumstances, mean that person's death.

And for the second example:—I have already intimated it when I spoke of being accustomed to having someone long since dead reappear in our dreams. This furnishes a valuable supplement to the products of primitive thinking. Imagine, if you please, some one who had slain an offensive relative and thrown his body to the vultures and hyenas. He is fully aware of the fact that the remains have decayed and fallen apart long ago, but all at once there stands before him during the night the whole body of the slain individual, as much alive as ever. Next day he satisfies himself that nothing has happened to the bodily remains. And thus there forces itself upon him a comparison with his own dream-soul and its independence of time, place and body. That which was capable of leaving one's body when one was asleep did not die when one died, and neither could it be destroyed when another was slain. And just as one knew, as a mat-

ter of experience, that one's dream-soul was capable of higher achievements than what the waking man could accomplish so one had to admit that a soul which a slayer had loosed from its body was capable of higher achievements than the living man had ever been capable of.

We see then, that because of the mistaken acceptance of dream experiences as realities there results, not merely without compulsion, but because of an inner necessity, a belief in spirits, in a personal soul and in its survival after death.

This misunderstanding has had tremendous consequences for mankind; for henceforth primitive man's world was filled with demoniac powers from whom one could not be safe for a single moment. One could protect oneself from a real creature of flesh and blood. Such a one was at least capable of being perceived by the senses and had himself only senses wherewith to perceive us. He could hear only what we really said. But in the domain of the ghostly dream soul there were unlimited possibilities which were independent of sense-perceptions. A spirit could hover about a place unrecognized. Even our most secret thoughts were not safe from it, let alone our overt wishes and acts. Nay, more! One was a match for a human opponent because of one's weapons, power and skill,—nay, perhaps even his superior; but one was doomed to utter helplessness in the presence of the same opponent in the shape of a spirit. There was sufficient inducement, then, for repaying like with like and thinking of a magical counterforce of a supernatural kind,—that is to say, of invoking the services of demoniac forces by all sorts of practices, for in no other way could one contend with a demoniac danger,

And here too it is the dream that supplies us with the key to the meaning of all sorts of magical rites. And again this is nothing more than the dreamer's imagined superior capabilities as compared with what his waking body is capable of. All magic is made up of the same elements: independence of time and place, and an ability to transform oneself into any shape one may wish;—these are the means from which the power of the dream-soul is wishfully composed and also the means which make all magic so powerful.

Let us but think of our fairy tales! Transforming the body of a gigantic dragonlike body into a mouse,—then changing into a gnat. The sorcerer can change himself into a bird, a cloud, water or wind, making himself resemble anything, even becoming wholly invisible and having the power of entering any place. Enough of this; we are sufficiently acquainted with these things from the fairy tales of our childhood. And in our dreams we experience the self-same things: figures are mysteriously transformed before our very eyes and we know this personage is so and so although he looks quite different from what he looked in life. And in addition thereto we can fly, can sojourn in the remotest countries, can perform superhuman feats and, above all, do little things in which we have but little luck in our waking life. In brief: dreams and magic have a wish-fulfilling character and are also identical in content. But it so happens that we have not only "good" wishes but are full of selfish and "wicked" desires, jealous and revengeful thoughts,—and what we know to be within ourselves we may *non jans droict* attribute also to others. And

that is why we believe that this world of demons surrounding us harbors an abundance of misfortunes for us,—just as we know that our own minds shelter misfortunes for others.

This leads man to the fantastic theory of *destiny*, as far as this emanates from without. Primitive man did not see in natural phenomena the natural consequences of natural causes but regarded everything as the arbitrary and wilful emanation of demoniac forces and referred everything fundamentally to his own person. One might almost say: primitive mankind as a whole was dominated by ideas of inferiority and persecution because of its paranoid tendency to refer everything to itself. We have here a grandiose paranoid system built up logically on a misunderstanding, a misinterpretation of natural phenomena, i. e., on a false premise on which the whole system stands—or falls; but unfortunately this understanding of the matter is of no more value than in paranoia, inasmuch as intellectual comprehension has no emotional value in the matter of superstitious affectivity.

We might now propose the following prize question: "What came first, punishment or sin?" In the light of our preceding comments one must come to the paradoxical conclusion that punishment came first and then the idea of sin. If we reflect that only because natural phenomena (especially those of a painful nature, e. g., sickness, death, distress, hunger, hail, lightning-stroke, floods, earthquakes, etc.) were conceived as something brought upon an individual by some mighty spirit, these phenomena took on the character of revengeful, punitive measures, we can understand that mankind was logically compelled to



discover the concept and the content of sin. One had to work out a reason why the demons had become irritated and angry. And so sin also became a logical consequence and was not something primary. "How did I deserve this?" we say even to-day, and only in a scientifically trained age was it possible to offset this attitude—against the impersonal character of destiny—by giving natural causes, in matters large and small, their due and thus freeing mankind from its pseudo-religious delusion of persecution.

One must consider well what a turning point in human history this signifies! Somewhere a pig belonging to an old peasant woman gets sick; the thought never even occurs to her that only natural causes could have been responsible for her misfortune; she looks upon it as a punishment for some sin or as an injury to her person. Her neighbors might have bewitched it! We, on the contrary, know that we had not been sufficiently clean, bacteria had been permitted to flourish, and instead of resorting to all kinds of hocus-pocus, we whitewash the pen and cleanse the pig with a solution of creolin. And so I exclaim again: What a turning point in the cultural history of mankind!—

It is on this basis that there then grew up primitive religious practices and sacrificial ceremonies. Once mankind had got to the point of regarding all its misfortunes and discomforts as the results of demoniac influence, one had to try to keep the demons in good spirits and to mollify the wrathful spirits, in case one did not succeed in securing (by means of magic and sorcery) the assistance of powerful spirits who would take upon themselves the protection of house and

home and personality, (as is done to this day by the Catholic saints,) and whose influence is more potent than that of the hostile spirits. All sacrificial practices are extraordinarily characteristic of this whole conception; for, no matter how potent the spirits of the deceased may be, they lack one thing they possessed in life: the sensuality of the body they had inhabited. They can, of course, live without food and affection, but they always seem to retain a longing for the delights of a delectable repast and spiritual love. As to this, too, primitive humanity projected its own longings upon the world of demons. In the spirit world too the craving for power seems to have only these two purposes (feeding and loving) in view, and all their malice and malignity, which we expect from the spirits, seem to have no other sources than a very comprehensible and justifiable envy of the sensuous enjoyments of those who still roam in the sunlight.

The content of all sacrificial practices grows out of this in a very simple way. Roughly speaking, they consist in offering up valued objects: but inasmuch as we do not rightly know how we may make them accessible to the demoniac powers, we lay the main emphasis *ab initio* on the renunciation of such valuable and delectable things as we would ourselves enjoy. We hope thus to allay the wicked envy of the deceased who have been cut off from sensuousness by injuring ourselves in the same manner or depriving ourselves of what the spirit creature must dispense with, and we thus fail to stir up its envy.

We need only think of our own pious ceremonials in mourning the loss of a member of one's family. These are of course misunderstood and attributed to



cordial and loving emotions, and this gives the impression that it would be impossible for us to give ourselves up to pleasures and delights after the death of one we had loved. But no matter how much this may correspond to a natural feeling, it is by no means the original meaning of the mourning conventionally prescribed. Our customs are not current because they correspond to what we feel but because it would appear "improper" to behave differently. But, then, everything that once was forbidden is now improper,—because it is considered dangerous and injurious to the common weal of a small or large community, and every breach against public *mores* is improper. But it is the correct thing to deny oneself amusements and festivities for a certain period after the death of kindred; behind this there was an assumption that all sorts of things connected with the death were still in close proximity with the survivors. The vindictiveness or revengefulness of the departed must not be aroused! That is why all wind and string instruments must be silenced; merry songs must not be heard; joyous ceremonies, e. g., marriage, must not be performed; going to the theatre and to entertainments is prohibited, and the wearing of gay garments as a symbol of a merry mood is forbidden. [Everything smacking of the gay, the joyous, the cheerful, the merry, is taboo.] In short, piety demands neither more nor less than the renunciation of all those things that in an ignorant age mankind renounced with full consciousness.

It developed quite logically that not only the individual but the whole clan heeded the strict observance of such venerable usages, for it was soon found

that misfortune not infrequently affected not only the individual but also the whole tribe, and consequently the omission of some such ritualistic observance became a public matter *res publica*. Thus for example, in the Roman law there were certain specific regulations which enforced the taking possession of even an incumbered inheritance, for otherwise the "penates sacrifices" would prove unavailing as regards any likelihood of reconciling the departed ancestor by the propitiatory practices of the survivors. And if the deceased became disagreeable and requited them for the omission of the sacrifices due them with hail and storms, then of course it was not only the crops of the disrespectful transgressor but also of the whole populace that suffered. Reason enough for bringing public pressure to bear on the offender!

And do we not observe how deeply intrenched in our blood the same thing is even in us of to-day? And isn't it clear why a whole community is outraged at the conduct of any one of its members who refuse to comply with its ancient customs or even dares publicly to mock at them? Looked at in its true nature, this is not a personal matter but essentially a public concern, as it is explicitly stated, for example, in the explanations of the 3d Commandment in the Protestant catechism where we read: "It is a sin to preach on a holy day if one does not crave for God's word and does so only on account of the weather or for entertainment, or to be doing

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\*Other reasons for our reaction to the mocker and disbeliever are his effectiveness in stirring up our own doubts and our envy of his courage and independence. Tr.



something, or to pass the time, and treats God's words lightly. Will God permit this to go unpunished? No! He punishes the land and the people thereof with poverty and devastation without end." (Cf. Caspari's Commentaries on Luther's Small Catechism, published in Erlangen in 1895.)

We see, then, that for one to whom these sentences are very truth, a person who desecrates a day of festival is a menace to his people and his country, and that his transgression is not avenged on him only. But all this is comprehensible only if we look at the matter from *our* point of view.

But let us now return to the realm of medical science, into the realm of the psychology of neuroses. What we designate as compulsive ideas and compulsive actions is, even in its minutest details, nothing but the compulsive emergence of some primitive superstition in a human being who in other respects belongs to a wholly different—and higher—cultural level. In some manner all sufferers from compulsions are dominated by a *fear of misfortune* in retaliation for their evil thoughts, be it for having wished death or disaster on some one, or for having harbored forbidden but pleasurable desires and intentions in their hearts. Somehow this revenges itself. For all vengeance that superior powers allot to us, humanity looks upon as *punishment!* And, besides, one of the most characteristic things about the compulsion neurotic is the fact that he is bowed down by the idea of the presence of an overwhelming power, and it is equally characteristic of him that he regards as *sacrilege* his natural repudiation of everything smacking of authority, which, he is sure, will be revenged on him. And now

he does something very peculiar: the apprehension of misfortune that dominates his life becomes such an unbearable and fearful condition that he is compelled to escape it somehow. He simply cannot bear the continuously menacing something-or-other and so he tries to forestall or prevent it by punishing himself or *pretending* that he is punishing himself.

Let us study the compulsion neurotic for a while as to this: He seems to respond to an imaginary uncleanness in his thoughts and desires with a pseudo-religious cleansing ceremonial, to purify (cleanse) himself by compulsively washing and ever washing himself. He imposes a thousand renunciations upon himself and becomes ascetic. He finds no time to enjoy life, because something within compels him to react to every pleasurable impulse with some penitential measure. Just when he thinks, for example, of sitting down to enjoy the reading of a fine book, he finds himself compelled to dust and cleanse a bookcase full of books. A nice suit of clothes that he likes he must not put on again because he had wished to make a good impression in it. The neurotic forbids himself such pleasures, and a senseless fear stands by as watchman and compels the performance of self-imposed penance intended as atonement for sin. It would seem, then, as if the compulsion neurotic dictated penalties for himself and imposed renunciations upon himself out of his unconscious so that he might, as it were, be in a position to say to the revengeful demoniac powers: "Now you may spare yourselves the trouble of doing me anything! I have punished myself!" In this kind of behavior there is something of a Polycrates motive which reckons with the "envy



of the gods," with the malignity and vindictiveness of the demoniac world, and which has also introduced what amounts almost to sadistic elements of a by no means divine kind into Christianity's god-concept. As to this we may compare the self-denial of the ascetic with our interpretation of sacrifices.

And all this grew out of a tremendous paranoid system of persecutory ideas and a habit of falsely seeing everything with reference to the ego [—delusions of reference],—a system which derived its justification in the magical realm of misapprehended dream experiences, a realm into which analytical psychology is at last, after thousands of years of error, bringing light.—

If the reader will bear in mind what has preceded, he will probably be ready to endorse the statement that all compulsions become clear if the chapter on "superstition" is understood. Let us now see whether anxiety-states [—conditions in which nervous apprehension is a prominent symptom] may not be interpreted from the same point of view. And as a matter of fact, superstitious elements do enter into them in abundance. The uncanny apprehension of some impending misfortune is in its every manifestation utterly and fundamentally different from mere fear of a threatened real danger. What gives it its peculiar character is its indefiniteness, its uncanniness. But we know from innumerable observations, which we may reconfirm as often as we please, that to a preponderatingly large extent anxiety-states are dominated, even though often unconsciously, by the idea that one might be overwhelmed sexually. Certain groups of hysteria may be almost wholly summed up under the formula of "thoughts of being murdered by

a Jack the Ripper," so significant a rôle does that admixture of pleasurable tension and apprehension terror which accompany the idea of being sexually assaulted play in their minds.

Granted that many invalids are quite in earnest in flooding the room with light in a search for an honest-to-goodness flesh and blood intruder before going to bed, in really believing in a man of flesh and blood when they are haunted by the old burglar-dreams that made the nights of their childhood terrible. But all these are misapprehensions which are eliminated as soon as they are understood to be superstitious beliefs and a fear of ghosts.

It is a suspicious circumstance in itself that most apprehensions of this kind shun the light of day and manifest themselves only at night or towards evening,—a characteristic which we all associate with spirits and ghosts. A man of real flesh and blood may be suspected of being concealed under the bed or even in a clothes closet; but what does it mean if a sufferer from apprehensions has to search impossible hiding places; e. g., bureau drawers? Does not this prove that the human shape of the feared assailant is really only a shape, a mask, a disguise which assumed a demoniacal power in the pursuit of sexual pleasure? And especially if we also take into consideration how closely allied all these imagined persecutors and burglars are to the personages in our own fear-dreams, and how extraordinarily often these are transformed in our dreams into animals,—just exactly as happens in fairy tales which, as we know, teem from the very earliest times with animal shapes into which human beings had been transformed by witches, etc.



After Freud had opened our eyes to the psychology of totemism, we learned to link up these animal shapes with the father-*imago*; so that we might maintain that *all [neurotic] fear of animals is, at bottom, a fear of one's father*, and in the cases in which the fear of animals also stands for a sexual assault the zoophobia would be *a disguised incest-wish* emanating from primitive times, from a time in which it was still a known fact that the totem animal represented the ancestor and founder of the clan. Going further back, we shall have to recognize in the dreaded burglar and in the tramp too, a father *imago*, but in both cases it will be a father of a supernatural ghostly kind, a father-principle that embraces the paternal in the ghost of the primal ancestors. I have been told of dreams in which the pursuing tramp changes into the dreamer's father and vice versa.

The religious and superstitious ideas of the past thousands of years are altogether too remote, else we should more readily perceive the meaning of such images and masks, but this ought not to be a difficult matter in the case of the hoodlum. For it has been ancient usage to degrade the gods of a superseded religion to the rank of evil devils and the butts for children's jeers. Thus Frigga (Freya) became a witch, Loki, a devil and Wodan (Odin, Wotan) the ghost of the mad hunter,—and in this way, I maintain, that Wodan the Wanderer, that figure clothed in heaven's blue mantle and with the great cloudy slouch hat, has been belittled into the hoodlum! The powerful god-image (Wall-father) is concealed behind this figure; and as he embodied the life-generating principle, to such an extent that he could not put

his foot down anywhere in the world but life burst forth under his feet, everything becoming fruitful where he cast his eyes lovingly, he became genuinely the creative, life-exuding principle,—and thus he became the most dangerous and the most prominent father-image of our dreams and of the fairy world of our neuroses; in brief, I maintain that all the personages who play the rôle in our apprehension hysterias and in our dreams of being assaulted never stand for living personages but for spirits which occasionally appear in human shape, e. g., as Pallas Athene appeared to Telemachus in the shape of his aged nurse.

These considerations bring us to those apprehension-states in which superstitious ideas about fructification and pregnancy play a rôle. The cultural history of past ages contains all sorts of pregnancy theories of a supernatural kind,—and if in case of apprehension hysteria the fear-wish for amatory contact with the realm of father-demons has once been aroused, then impregnation by all sorts of magical acts becomes possible. Eyes and ears, nose and mouth, are portals of entry for wicked magic against which we may protect ourselves, as we know, by spitting three times or by sneezing,—because of which belief it has been customary from time immemorial to say to one who sneezes: "may it do you good!" "Prosit" may therefore mean "may you have succeeded in frustrating in time the danger of the entry of magical substances and in expelling them!"

If in connection with this we think of a series of phobias, e. g., the fear of poisoned food, we shall easily recognize in them too a superstitious element. And, after all, are not all phobias superstitions? Is it not supernatural (demonic)



forces from whom we anticipate misfortunes, e. g., while crossing a bridge, in the train, in the street, while confined in a closed chamber, and other similar typical situations with which the student of the psychoneuroses is sufficiently familiar? The victim of phobias does not think of real dangers, nor of such imaginary dangers as are experienced by timid children; no, he is only *superstitiously* visualizing demonic powers who threaten our lives because of their natural malevolence or because of some sort of vindictiveness.

These few suggestions may serve to stimulate the reader to investigate how much of the phenomena we designate

as "neurotic" is of a superstitious nature. Neuroses and superstitions have also this in common, that they do not yield to any theory of being logically explicable. I may be ever so convinced that it is absurd to be afraid of being the thirteenth at table and yet be unable to be at my ease on discovering that I am one of thirteen. The roots of the fear lie deeper, and to attempt to correct the latest superficial manifestations is an absurdly Sisyphean task. These superficial and deeper aspects can be cured only if we can unearth the forces that sought and found the symbolic incarnation which constitutes the symptom.

(Translated by S. A. Tannenbaum)



# Psychoanalysis and the Practice of Medicine

(Continued from 2:160)

By Johs. Stromme, M. D., Kristiania.

In what has preceded, Ladies and Gentlemen, we have considered briefly the general cause of nervousness, viz.: dislike for work.

### *Objections:*

And now there arises a storm of protest against this idea—even from you. Why? Because not one of us feels himself free from guilt in this regard. We are all imperfect creatures, from the cradle to the grave we are all subject to auto-suggestion and hetero-suggestion, i. e., to educational influences emanating from our parents, our schools, our newspapers, literature and our contemporaries. Auto-suggestion plays a no unimportant rôle, as, for example, in the case of the individual who thinks he cannot sleep because he drank a glass of tea before he went to bed. This represents a general reaction, a general sin, if I may so term it, a sign of the times. It would therefore be a source of wonder to us if there were no protest against my thesis. But I must admit that not all are to be called nervous who might manifest these tendencies, even though to a high degree. I quite agree with Groddeck in thinking it utterly erroneous, and dangerously so, to assume that only the hysterical have the ability of making themselves sick for one or other purpose. Every person possesses this faculty and uses it to some extent. Let us take an example from daily life. The

newspapers recently reported that a well-known prima donna had "caught a cold" and would be unable to sing as scheduled. But few noted that she was quite pleased with her "cold" because the way the parts were cast, her associates and the director did not suit her as a background for her talents. In non-neurotic persons the mask is more easily recognized than in the neurotic whose mask can be removed only by the exercise of the utmost cunning. One who penetrates deeply into the complicated psychic processes soon realizes that the apparently conscious purposes on which the symptoms are founded emanate from unconscious sources. The unconscious! To many the idea of an unconscious mind is a sort of chimera, like an unproved hypothesis, set up to give everything an unintelligible and mystical character. Why, even eminent psychotherapists, e. g., Professor Forel, deny the existence of an unconscious in man. (I may add that Forel is illogical. He recognizes psychoanalysis,—which proves that he accepts its results without knowing the deeper essence of the treatment.) It is quite natural for you to recoil when you are told by the analyst that mankind's general dislike for work, laziness, is the general cause for "nervousness." (My highly esteemed teacher and friend, Dr. O. Pfister, has told me that he does not agree with



me as to this, but this does not deter me from repeating it.) But only few know that the analyst's most difficult task consists in removing the inhibitions which interfere with pleasure in work and that this is the alpha and the omega of our treatment. In the fine lecture he gave last year, Dr. Geijerstamm says: "Has the patient a conscious morality which inhibits an unconscious pleasure in work?" His affirmative answer is based on the intense and fruitful labors of many years. The experiences of such a man cannot be lightly ignored. The inhibitions to pleasure from work are the pathogenic factor, whether they be conscious or unconscious. And if these inhibitions can be removed, the patient is cured. In other words, our task is to bring these inhibitions to consciousness,\* so that the patient may master them. An analysis therefore becomes an ethical education, a form of learning to know oneself, to govern oneself and to elevate oneself.

The first objection offered is this: there are many nervous persons who not only are not lazy but who work more than anybody else. I too know many such. But I must not be tempted to resort to the maxim that it is the exception which proves the rule. This aphorism, like so many other scraps of universal wisdom, is a lie. If there were a single nervous person who is not lazy then my assertion would be false. We must therefore question the individual neurotic to ascertain his formula. Apart

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\*To avoid misunderstanding I must emphasise that there is no such thing as unconscious inhibitions; these are always conscious. But these conscious restraints are never conceived of as such.

from those whose object it is to elicit sympathy—and these are the most difficult cases to handle—we shall find that most neurotics dislike their work, that they are lacking in pleasure as an inner life-force. (*Sit venia verbo.*) They want the pleasure of working. And just because they seek to evade one thing or another that is required of them, what they are obligated to do with love and pleasure, work becomes for them a kind of punishment, a badge of slavery. I know a woman who does not keep a maid but hates the noisy romping of children. Instead of centering her interest on her home, instead of assisting her devoted husband in the difficult task of providing for the household, she occupies herself with all sorts of useless *fol-de-rols*, attends all sorts of lectures, only as an escape from doing the work in her home where she ought to be the cheering sun. Who would say that she is lazy? Don't you think she hears the small voice of conscience?

If you say that there are people who are lazy but not nervous, I heartily agree with you. But since my eyes have been opened to the technique of substitution I do not see many such persons. Of most of these it may be said that their inmost being is hidden from our view. I would never dare to say that their conscience sleeps. And if they shut their ears to it it is because they want the neurotic's high moral concepts. The trouble is of a wholly different nature in the case of the lazy person whose productivity is manifested not as neurotic symptoms but as something socially useful.

There are a thousand objections but I must ignore them and devote my attention only to the following one: "It is extremely harmful to touch the bleed-



ing wounds of the soul." Or: "It is very dangerous to bring the inhibitions into consciousness." We often hear such nonsense. What is demanded of us physicians is the very opposite, viz.: to help those who suffer.

As I have so often said, it is laziness that is the general cause of nervousness. But, as I have also said, two causes are necessary: the general cause and the special (individual) cause. It is the latter which determines why this one suffers from asthma, the other from appendicitis, that other one from migraine or epilepsy, etc. For such an audience as this the latter is by far the more interesting theme. Over the general cause, laziness and lovelessness, there hovers a certain suggestion of atmospheric closeness, a certain degree of guiltiness,—not withstanding that it cannot be so, for invalids do discuss themselves bona fide and do not suspect that they are guilty of this offense, yet punish themselves severely therefor. And we must bow to this respectfully and not meet them with any lack of affection,—for in that case we should be acting in a neurotic manner if we recoiled from them. Only in the service of truth have I directed your attention to the discreditable aspect of the patient's character, but the physician who wants to prove helpful must never have the thought that his patient is a bad person.

#### *Special Causes:*

Before I proceed to the consideration of the special formula I must again compare the two types of nervousness, because they react differently. The neurotic is content with his life-lie and labels himself, with a kind of self-satisfaction, as an inferior, saying to himself: "I am

a blockhead, an ass, a fly in a bottle, understand nothing, and can learn nothing." A very convenient trick for one who doesn't want to take the trouble to learn. But he will not admit that to himself. Such a feeling of inferiority (a feeling of impotency) is ordinarily a spur to self-improvement, but the neurotic uses it to put himself in the position of a child. These are the narcissists (Freud) who even in their old age look like children and who behave as if they were spoiled, curious, capricious children. The hysteric, on the contrary, creates for himself certain symptoms, some psychic, some somatic. In conversion hysteria there is a certain somatic predisposition which permits ideas to express themselves through existent somatic conditions. The urge to expend energy, present in all persons, is inhibited by the neurotic, cannot manifest itself because his consciousness opposes it. In consequence it finds an outlet in all sorts of devious ways. Here we encounter a psychologic factor of the utmost importance. As a result of the conscious resistance to the unconscious demands, these manifest themselves in disguised forms as symptoms. And what is resistance? Laziness. And what means does it employ? Repression (Freud) which constitutes the connecting link between the general and the special causes of nervousness and emanates from the dislike for work. *Repression (Freud):*

The neurotic has a phenomenal capacity for forgetting. One of the neurotic's commonest complaints is his poor memory. Passive forgetting, i. e., the removal of one's interest from an object that is no longer to remain in the field of consciousness, has nothing to do with the neurotic state. We are interested



only in active forgetting, the ability to push out of consciousness objects that do possess interest. And it turns out that all those things are forgotten that are painful, unpleasurable, disgraceful, difficult, humiliating, etc. He is incapable of diverting his interest from them, so he devotes more interest (energy) to the task of shoving these experiences aside. All nervousness depends upon the capacity for forcing experiences out of consciousness,—a capacity that is extraordinarily large. You have no idea how large it is! A 54-year old woman, suffering from Basedow's disease ("grief hysteria"), came to me one day in utter despair, asserting that nothing could help her, that her feelings had become completely callous and that she was fit only for the insane asylum. She had received a letter from a friend, requesting her to make some purchase for her. She had left the house that forenoon with the intention of making that purchase before she came to me. On her way to the car she had made up her mind to what store to go, but no sooner had she sat down in the car than she forgot the name of the store as well as what she was to buy. Inasmuch as her despair made it impossible to discuss the matter with her (she demonstrated her psychic wound by weeping blood—probably a mixture of tears and blood from the nose), I asked her to mention any three names that might resemble the name of the shop she had intended to visit. After sobbing some minutes she produced a name: Hauson. By the exercise of patience I succeeded in getting the following from her: "I was sitting in the waiting room and read that Professor Ingstad had departed; I want to say his name.—And as I came here I passed by

the Halling School." So then the three words were: Hauson, Ingstad, Halling, and the result was that she wished to go to Hallingstad's store to purchase wicker furniture. It's not always pleasant to make purchases for another, and our patient did not like it though she had decided to do so. The cause of her forgetfulness was the fact that in the car she thought of a woman of the same name (Hallingstad) who had been inflicting her woes upon her to such an extent that she (our patient) had resolved nevermore to speak to her or to think of her; she had, moreover, identified herself with her.

A woman in the early forties, suffering from epilepsy, was standing at the corner of Oscar Street and Drogue Lane, fully conscious but not knowing what she was to do that forenoon. Finally she recollected that she was on her way to me. But she could not recall my name nor where I live, though she has been coming to me for two months past and was standing in the very street in which I live. And, be it noted, she was not in a confused state of mind. She had to go home and ascertain my name and address. I need hardly add that she was not very desirous of coming to me, notwithstanding that in her consciousness her treatment gave her great pleasure,—a typical phenomenon when one has reached the stage where the resistances are too great.

These examples illustrate, I think, the intense power of the repression-mechanism. And yet this power is infinitely stronger than you can get any idea of. Obviously with each recurring repression more and more ideas and memories are repressed and apparently trifling details are wiped out in the process. These



old repressed ideas take new ones along with them, whereas the displeasure keeps pushing them out and intensifies the repression. It turns out that all such affective (emotionally endowed), forgotten ideas lie in the unconscious like "poison-complexes" and sneak out at the first favorable opportunity to torture the afflicted one. They retain their unpleasant character exactly as when they were in consciousness, and will retain it undiminished by the tooth of time. They do not keep pace with the growth and evolution of the individual; that is why all neurotics have an infantile character which disappears when the apparently pathogenic experiences are brought to the light of day. They come forth when the repressions are eliminated,—and to the great surprise of the patients the memories and the associated emotions which they had to forget were in no sense "poison-complexes,"—they prove only that the patients had reacted with displeasure to something that was required of them. In other words, they had repressed the pleasure of doing.

*The Return of the Repressed:*

I have mentioned it that all these experiences live unaltered in the unconscious; but owing to their energy-endowment they are constantly striving to enter consciousness and thus there ensues an obstinate conflict between the repressing force and the repressed matter: a conflict between the individual's two personalities. The resistance will take no cognizance of the experiences. But what do these do? They nevertheless have their will—inasmuch as they manifest themselves as pathogenic symptoms of one kind or another. It is at this point that *the individual factor* enters. The type of reaction peculiar to the patient

determines the variety of neurosis he is to have. For practical reasons I shall cite different examples and make a few comments on them.

A year ago I had under treatment a man suffering from a phobia which manifested itself as a great fear of going out into the street alone; he had to have an escort, no matter where he went. Work of any kind was out of the question for him. When in the street he was constantly apprehensive of striking a mine; he bought all the daily papers and scanned them carefully for accounts of mine explosions. And if he happened to read of the sinking of a ship he had to rush home pell mell and throw himself on the sofa. At the same time he would work himself into a rage over Kaiser Wilhelm till it would seem he was on the point of bursting. His friends thought him crazy. But as soon as his fear passed he was the most congenial and kindly disposed fellow in the world and quite normal. He admitted that he thought of himself as a ship and that he feared that he might suffer shipwreck on the voyage of life. But this idea gave him no relief. As I have already said, he hated work like the plague. (He was an engineer of bridges.) You will understand his phobia when I tell you that it depended on a fear of the women of the street and that it began in February, 1917, some time after he had contracted a gonorrhoea (from a woman named Wilhelmine) on the occasion of his first and only coitus. We who know that woman represents work are not surprised at his dislike for work.

This case of apprehension hysteria is noteworthy because, unlike most other patients, he had not devised all sorts of



methods of overcoming his fear. He used his fear as a defense. Because of this his case is easily comprehensible and teaches us a number of things. We see that the repressed memory forced itself into consciousness in an altered shape. His fear of and rage at Wilhelmine [— "Wilhelm" (William) and "Mine" (mine)] became a fear of mines and rage at (Kaiser) Wilhelm. (This was a fairly common phenomenon in Norway in those days.) In other words: the emotions reappear unaltered (even intensified), but the objects are changed. There has been a displacement of the emotions from the original (subjective) object to another (objective) object. We call this displacement, if it transpires in the psyche, *substitution* (after Freud). It is to be noted that the content of the phobia is literally identical with that of the repressed experience. All nervous maladies show a dependence upon the letter with an amazing distinctness and effectiveness. Such witticisms cannot be matched anywhere else, and the patient's capacity for dramatization is limitless. How can it transpire that an intelligent man gets into such a dilemma as this phobia, this flight from reality is? I can still see this despairing man and his great relief when I solved the mystery for him. He spoke not a word, stood up, went into the waiting-room and calmly told his escort: "You may go; I don't need you any more!" The matter is simple enough if one bears in mind that an idea consists of words and substance. The unconscious comprehends only concrete entities, whereas the conscious is alive only to words and letters, forcing concrete entities back. The repressed affect breaks out and links itself up with the words, whereas the

material content is deprived of associative connections which consciousness does not permit. It will have nothing to do with any material contents, and hence it is the analyst's task to bring these to light. The material must be linked up with the emotions, so that consciousness may control the whole matter. The stronger affect becomes comprehensible if we bear clearly in mind that the repressed but returning energy takes along with itself formerly repressed energies and clings to the letter. Our case is also interesting as showing how a disease comes into being. In February, 1917, coincident with the commencement of "ruthless submarine warfare," he happened to read an obscene story about Queen Wilhelmina. He recalled that the story had an uncommonly powerful effect on him and that his fear of mines came shortly after this.

In the above case of apprehension hysteria we again see repression almost in the form of a psychotic symptom. Such substitutions play us all kinds of tricks. We find this in a pure culture, so to say, in the compulsion neuroses. These states which often avail themselves, most cunningly, of all the senses where the hysterical traits are conspicuous, I must discuss more at length.

A man of 34 who had been suffering for twenty years from a compulsion neurosis presented a series of complicated compulsive mechanisms in which the secondary defense amounted to a psychosis. Thus, for example, he was utterly wretched if after combing his head he found a single hair on his comb. His fear of losing his hair was so overwhelming that it darkened his life. The best remedy against his malady was massage, but, alas! after each massage he discovered



more loose hair and he became utterly miserable. Notwithstanding this, he had to have his scalp massaged daily and his dilemma was measureless. Such a mental state is always based on symbols which have been interpreted literally. Hair is a symbol of power, energy, interest. (Cf. Samson!) His despair was really related to the loss of "power" (—sperma) resulting from daily onanism (N. B. daily massage). The feeling of guilt in connection with laziness, distraction, was erroneously ascribed to onanism and thence to his loss of hair, and thus the significance of the onanism was diminished. He was an exceedingly economical individual with a strong "greed-complex," and consequently discontented with his wastefulness. His inner obligation to spend was apperceived literally and this compelled him to masturbate continually. I was obliged therefore first of all to solve the displacement of the feeling of guiltiness: first from hair to sperma and thence back to pleasure in work. In this I succeeded by abolishing the slavery of the letter and proving to him that he had identified sperma with interest,—in other words, I taught him Stekel's laws of equivalents (pleasure in work—sperma—hair, etc.).\*

This patient was very often troubled by the following symptom: while he was reading a book, some picture or other would seem to cover the page and interfere with his reading. To get rid of these pictures he would have to make certain movements with the book or he would imagine some cleverly constructed tube-like instrument with which he could suck up the picture or blow it away. Quite often the imaginary picture covering the page was that of a sturgeon (acipenser sturio). Everytime this happened he had to vomit. It turned out

that when he was ten years old he had seen a sturgeon which was being stuffed for the collection in his school. He got sick at the time and brought up his food. But why should this vision have reappeared to him four years later and why did it begin? Everytime he became inattentive during a reading lesson, or distracted, confused, or permitted his thoughts to wander, he would hear his teacher's warning voice: "You must not permit yourself to be disturbed!" [To understand this word play the reader must know that the German word for "to disturb" (*stoeren*) is phonetically similar to the word for "sturgeon" (*Stoers*).]

A man of 44, suffering from compulsion neurosis and, above all, suicidal ideas,

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\*Stekel's four laws of symbolic equivalents are these: 1. In dreams and in the unconscious all bodily openings resemble (and may stand for) one another; so that the mouth, eyes, nares, anus, vagina, meatus urinarius, and the umbilicus may substitute one another. 2. All secretions and excretions (wax, nasal mucus, blood, pus, urine, water, stool, semen, milk, saliva, tears, perspiration) are equivalents of one another, but may also stand for the soul, the air, speech, breath, flatus, money and poison. 3. All paired organs (breasts, thumbs, big toes, ears, feet, thighs, arms, nates, eyes, lips, testes, nares) may represent each other as well as the phallus, sisters and brothers. 4. All dream affects are equivalents of (and may stand for) one another, i. e., love may mean hatred, irony admiration, etc. 100 per cent Freudians do not publicly acknowledge allegiance to these rules, but in private they make liberal use of them.—S. A. T,



was tortured by the following symptom: everytime he looked at his wife he saw only a stroke [i. e., a line]. At first he saw only an imaginary stroke across his wife's face, but gradually the line grew longer and extended over her whole body; finally he saw nothing but this stroke when he looked at her. It proved that this symptom emanated from the wish "to strike his wife out" [as one strikes out something one has written] and that he repressed this wish. What he would have wished to undo in himself was the personality that his wife represented. She was lazy and unreliable, as he was to an even higher degree.

A man of 35, suffering from a compulsion neurosis, was tortured by hallucinations which he accepted as real pictures. These were of the most diverse kinds in accordance with the identifications. The most frequent of these pictures were those of noseless persons (i. e., castrated, lazy), tubercular individuals, etc., who suddenly appeared before him in his walks and wormed themselves into his breast in a most painful manner. To get rid of them he had to walk the same walk twice, stepping one step backward, etc., like the penitential monks who, we are told, took one step back for every second step forward. It turned out that this patient was sunk in religious broodings and had taken these words to heart: "One who does not do his master's will gets many blows." This incarnation of thoughts and ideas is quite remarkable.

A woman of 25 suffered from the compulsion to overthrow all stools, flower-pots, etc. She could, as a rule, inhibit the impulse in time, but now and then she happened to overturn a chair. This was due to the fact that something with-

in her wished to be reversed. She had become nervous while studying music in Italy and the physicians had told her to give up her music and go home,—the opposite of what she should have done. The transition from substitution to insanity is not very difficult. And the circumstance that the symbol is taken literally and that the patient acts in accordance with the letter, contrary to all common sense, the subjective being taken objectively, is enough to modify reality in accordance with one's wishes.

#### *Conversion (Freud):*

In conversion hysteria we see an actual (present) situation built upon an old memory. I want to cite a few illustrations which will also serve to give us additional insight into the unconscious mental processes.

A very intelligent man of 52, a typical conversion-hysteric, formerly the owner and manager of a machine shop, was treated by me last year. He was of the opinion that his malady had been with him for 45 years. One day he came into my office limping and complaining of cramps in the thigh and leg muscles of the right limb. He was in despair; the cramps had disturbed his sleep and reminded him of similar cramps he had suffered from daily for three months some 15 years ago and to the extent of being wholly unable to do his work. Now he was sure there was no hope for him. While he sat talking to me I noticed that his spasmodic movements did not cease, so I called his attention to the fact that the motion resembled that performed by a person sitting at a turning-lathe. His amazement was comical and he at once told me of a dream he had had about a turning-lathe. This was the dream: *I was in the shop of "Patent-Olsen" and*



he came and asked me whether I was willing now to begin on the lathe, to which I replied that I was too ill and nervous to do so. We see that owing to his refusal he has to stand here and, as it were, drive the lathe spasmodically. It is our business to ascertain what it was that he had rejected yesterday and why. And it turns out that a lady had visited him the night before and urged him to cohabit with her but that he had refused because of his "illness and nervousness." That was the lathe. (In Norway the word meaning "to turn" is vulgarly used for "to cohabit.")<sup>\*</sup> This association does not answer the question why it happened. Such a symptom is always a manifestation of resistance; to a man a woman is a symbol for work, and so, too, we discovered that the preceding day he had been too lazy to come for his analysis and was punishing himself therefor. His work was the real lathe. That his cramp immediately disappeared you will understand as well as that it would be stupid to employ an anatomical yard-stick for such nervous symptoms.

A few years ago I treated an elderly Swedish gentleman who manifested his resistance mainly in the shape of phobias. One day he came to me and complained of seeing no colors but blue. Everything, houses, trees, the yellow walls of my office, my green hangings, my red table-lamp, etc., was blue. We could not solve the riddle that hour, even by means of the patient's suggestion that "his cure lay in the blue" (i. e., in the

dim future). The following day he saw normally again. But just a week later the symptom recurred and we had to attack the problem in earnest. We discovered that the symptom first appeared on a Monday following a Sunday on which he had drunk too much, i. e., on a "blue Monday" (as we call it). He had had a glass of port Sunday evening and therefore really had no occasion for having a "blue Monday." But it's very nice to get an extra Friday (i. e., a day off)!

A woman of 37, suffering from decided neuralgic symptoms, was under treatment for various hysterical symptoms, among them paresis of the right arm, ulcer of the stomach and torticollis [wry-neck]. The latter symptom had lasted seven years and resisted all treatment, including massage, electricity, baths, and other suggestive procedures, even by Dr. Westerlund. It turned out that in her early childhood she had been self-willed and insistent on her rights—she was an only child—and her parents had therefore often called her stiff-necked [torticollis!]. After her father's death she showed the whole world how "stiff-necked" [i. e., obstinate] she was, so as to demonstrate her prorogued obedience.

This slavish loyalty to the letter must amaze you all. It is exactly as if we were to plant Charlotte-onions and found tulips growing in their place. But, notwithstanding this, you will recognize some of the mechanisms I have mentioned. Among other things we note that the symptoms tell the patient something: don't be obstinate,—continue to work at your turntable,—don't celebrate a blue Monday, etc. It is the unconscious compulsion which works its will in a manner quite unacceptable to the patient, inasmuch as the resistance intrudes itself

<sup>\*</sup>English readers acquainted with "Othello" know that "to turn" was an Elizabethan vulgarism for to "cohabit."—S. A. T.



obstructively.

How are we to understand the conversion of an idea into a bodily symptom? You shall see at once that the neurotic makes most remarkable use of the very general formula: "Now I am in the same position in which I was when" . . . ; out of the present situation they reconstruct an old experience, and so the following formula is established: "The present situation is identical with the situation I was in when. . . ."

Before I proceed I want to cite a few more examples of such alterations in situations.

A patient (the above-mentioned 52-year old hysteric) had the following transitory symptom: he awoke one night with a terrible hammering in his head and a feeling of terror, sure that he was going to lose his reason (as his sister had). The same thing had happened to him 25 years ago and so strongly that he was convinced that "within a few months he would be at the abyss." It was a really difficult task to get at the meaning of this hammering in his head for he was incapable of thinking, of associating. As we have already pointed out, resistance has no better tool than headaches as a means of arresting thought. But after awhile we succeeded in digging out this memory: "Once while he was the owner of a shop he was called on to repair a steamboat (the *Grei*) whose machinery was hammering and working improperly. Fifteen to twenty other machinists had tried to repair it before him, but without success. (The patient had consulted 15 to 20 physicians for the hammering in his head.) He however, soon found the cause of the trouble to be in the axle of the screw being out of center. He put a piece of paper

on one side of the coupling and the banging ceased at once.' Now we have it! The beating in his head would cease if he could center his axle (i. e., concentrate his attention)—but the hammering continued. I asked him in what manner he was enabled to find the trouble in the machine and he explained that he put a file between his teeth and put the point of the file on the part of the machine that he wished to examine. That's what he had done with the "*Grei*" and when the point of the file reached the coupling there was a loud banging. And that's exactly the banging in his head now. The present situation exactly reproduced that one. And thus we discover the actual (present) situation: the preceding day he had been brooding about himself and his malady. And he was unable to discover the trouble because he couldn't even think. No, that was quite a different matter when, with his file and his hammer, he was an expert in machinery. Thus, with his pencil in his mouth, he continued to ruminate. He really takes no interest in his work any more (he is a merchant) but that could not be the cause, surely. No; there was no use looking for the trouble.

We see then that this symptom virtually says to him: "Seek and ye shall find."

A lady in the forties, suffering from gastric and intestinal symptoms of psychic origin, suddenly became deaf as a transitory symptom. For many years she had had periods of deafness and tinnitus alternating with normal hearing. She was convinced of the psychic origin of the deafness. In one of her dreams there was a situation in which she sat reading a remembrance book. To this dream fragment she associated the recollection



of an incident when she had been reading a passage by Pastor Svendsen but couldn't follow his argument because of a headache she was suffering from. The preceding day she had not had enough energy to be attentive during her analysis and had gone home with the thought that owing to her headache she could not follow me,—not acknowledging that the real cause was mere disinclination. The matter became clear when she declared that Pastor Svendsen was Pastor for the deaf—and that she had turned a deaf ear to me. I had been preaching to deaf ears. I need hardly add that her hearing was at once restored.

In these examples we see the ethical personality which says: you have found out the trouble with the machine, concentrate your energy;—you must listen and grasp what the Doctor says. But at the same time we see how the present situation is distorted to resemble a past experience. Resistance is equipped with powerful tools.

A woman of 56, afflicted with a typical conversion hysteria, with headaches and vomiting as the most frequent and the most important symptoms, was getting along very well until one Sunday when she met a friend who invited her to have tea with her the following Tuesday evening. The patient had said: "Thank you, I shall come if I am well enough to do so." Tuesday came; she was well, but the weather was not very nice; it was raining a little and she did not feel like going; she never liked riding in the street cars, anyhow. That evening she got a severe headache and vomited all night. Why? In the first place, because she had not kept her promise and carried out her obligation; in the second place, her friend could see

that she was not well enough to make visits. It is a horrible thing to be a liar, —it's much less reprehensible to deceive oneself.

#### *Identification:*

The ability to transform a situation in accordance with an old copy, to reactivate a forgotten situation because they now find themselves in a similar situation, is a typical feature of conversion hysteria. But the present situation may, as a matter of fact, be apparently unlike the old repressed experience. And yet the appertinent chain of associations can usually be discovered. It is amazing with what exactness the minutest details in the original situation can be paralleled in the present. This brings me to the subject of identification, the most important factor in hysteria. The identification of situation with situation becomes considerably easier if the personages can be identified with one another. This plays such an important role that I can only with difficulty give you any adequate idea of it. I shall say nothing of "physiological identification" (e. g., a son identifying himself with his father, a woman who has so identified herself with her husband that at their golden anniversary they resemble each other like two drops of water, etc.), and devote myself only to "pathological identification" which brings about most incredible effects.

An engineer who had for many years resided in a small German city was suffering from apprehension hysteria. One day he told me that for more than a week he has had to awake every hour in the night and had to check this up by the clock. Exactly on the hour he would awake, look at the clock and fall asleep. Free associations brought us to recollections of the little German city and to an



identification of himself with the night watchman. He, therefore, was the night-watchman. But why? Simply because lately he had developed the habit of bringing his cane down heavily on the sidewalk when he went out for a walk. And inasmuch as the watchman did that he became, by a kind of Erasmus Montanus logic, a night watchman and had to look at the clock.

A woman of 58 was suffering from cardiac symptoms, headaches and constipation. Her mother had died of heart disease and her father had suffered all his life from headaches and obstipation. After their deaths she had to take their place and also provide for the whole family, to be both father and mother to her younger brothers and sisters, and so she also adopted her parents' diseases.

The previously mentioned manufacturer had a habit of spasmodically drawing his left cheek up every time he spoke to a customer. This tic was due to his

identification of himself with a salesgirl he had employed some years before and whose cheek twitched constantly while she was in the store. Now he had to attend to his customers himself, he longed for the girl—and then came the symptom.

This identification is of the utmost value during an analysis, inasmuch as one or other personage is constantly recurring in the patient's dreams and these persons always represent the dreamer himself. The description of the person exactly fits the patient and his subjective attitude the day preceding the dream, and this furnishes the analyst with an excellent means of gauging the patient's condition.

The re-emergence of the repressed matters has not been exhausted in these pages,—in fact, it has hardly been mentioned. But I want to direct your attention to a third mechanism, viz.: *reaction formation*.

*(To be continued.)*

*(Translated by S. A. Tannenbaum)*





# The Father\*

(*A Tragedy by August Strindberg*)

By L. Kaplan, Zürich.

In the analysis of this powerful drama, as well as of the well-known novel of Oscar Wilde to be discussed in my next essay, little recourse will be had to the comparative method that was employed in the previous papers. The explanation will be reached by means of another process. The mental and emotional states of man find expression, as a rule, in various kinds of symptoms. As an example: Wilde gives a striking description of Dorian Gray, after the murder of Basil Hallward, the painter, which is very characteristic of this mode of self-betrayal. As soon as Dorian is alone, he lights a cigarette and diverts himself by sketching. At first his drawings are of flowers, then of architectural views. Finally he drifts to human countenances. Suddenly he perceives that *every face that he has drawn presents a phantastic similarity to Basil Hallward's features*. Unwittingly, therefore, and even against his will to shut out the recollection of his fell deed, Dorian's consciousness succumbs to the inevitable. The indifferent objects, bearing no relation to the emotional state, are supplanted by the one figure he would most fain cast out of his mind.

The writer of a work of fiction is in

\*The reader will find a fairly good translation of Strindberg's play in T. H. Dickinson's *Chief Contemporary Dramatists*, 1913, pp. 603-625.—A. G.

the same condition as Dorian. Scarcely a line of his novel or play but contains a symptom, a telltale reference to a hidden mental or emotional state, not only of the characters he portrays but also of his own. The symptoms may not, of course, always be clear, or at least not patent enough for him that reads. Not infrequently, however, they are quite manifest to the attentive reader, or can be construed by him from the general bearing of the context. And when discovered and fully apprehended, they yield information as to the psychological background of the literary work. (Cf. S. Freud, *Die Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens* [The P. of Everyday Life], Berlin, ed. 7, 1920).

Strindberg's writings furnish a quantity of psychologically valuable material. Even his earliest stories give proof of a strong belief in the selfishness and immorality of women. Strindberg's *The Father* is perhaps his most typical embodiment of his fanatical hatred of womankind. It is symptomatic, however, not only of his misogyny but also of a tragic phase of unsurmounted infantile eroticism. It must be remembered that Strindberg, like the Captain in *The Father*, suffered at different times from mental attacks, and that he died insane.

The relations existing between man and woman within the limits of organized middle-class society are at best



unedifying. And this unappetizing savor runs like a red streak thru the three acts of Strindberg's tragedy. It becomes, in fact, the distinguishing hallmark of the play. Man is burdened with the duty of providing for his wife and children; woman, on the other hand, is deprived of her social and legal independence and is relegated into a pitifully narrow circle of activities. Or, as the Captain in our drama formulates it: "She has legally sold her birthright and resigned her privileges in exchange for the husband's obligation of providing for herself and her child." This bargain, however, is but rarely of advantage to the parties concerned. Too often the man is forced to give up his most cherished ideals in the bitter economic struggle of life and to be degraded gradually into the rôle of a mere breadwinning slave of his family. The woman, on her part, especially if she be endowed with a lively temperament and a keen intellect, cannot be content in the subordinate position that is assigned to her in her home and in society at large. This inevitably results in friction and in discontent which sooner or later influence their erotic relationship, poison their marital life, and change the home into hell.

As a rule, however, such strained conjugal relations are tolerated for the sake of the children. Husband and wife, feeling that their union is a failure, that they have been deceived in each other, hope to discover a substitute for lost happiness in their love for their offspring. The child is expected to still the father's as well as the mother's craving for love. The child is petted, spoiled and deified, or degraded into a mere doll or plaything of parental caprice.

And, what is still more deplorable, there ensues a struggle between the parents for the right to monopolize this plaything, to exercise exclusive supervision over it for the purpose of realizing their own individual, egotistic desires and ambitions.

A few quotations from Strindberg's play will amply bear out the general statements that we have just made. The Captain, who feels that the life of one's children is the only possible conception of immortality, taxes his wife, Laura, with doing everything in her power to thwart his plans for the upbringing of their daughter. "You women have been compassionate enough to free the black slaves, but you are still keeping white ones. I have worked and slaved for you, your child, your mother, your servants; I have sacrificed my future and my career; I have endured torture, torment, sleepless nights, worry, for your sake; my hair has grown gray in your service; and all that you might live free from care, and that when you grow old you may live your life over again in your child."

Instead of devoting himself wholly to his scientific inclinations, he was forced to enter upon a military career. His wife, whose outlook upon life is circumscribed by the duties of her little household, has no understanding for his idealistic aspirations, and attempts, with the best of intentions, to place various obstacles in his way. Thus, for example, she has intercepted his entire correspondence with bookdealers, with the result that, for lack of necessary literature, he is unable to complete his latest scientific investigation. Called to account for this underhanded deed, she defends herself: "I had the best of intentions, for you



neglect your service because of your other work." Her husband is, to her, only her and her child's provider. And she is resolved that this most important function of man in a civil marriage shall in no wise be disturbed. To the ordinary married woman that goes without saying.

And what role is assigned to the child born of this union? The following scene answers the question:

*Laura.*— . . . What has this whole life and death struggle been but for power?

*Captain.*—To me it has meant more. I do not believe in a hereafter; the child was my future life. That was my conception of immortality, and perhaps the only one that has any meaning in reality. If you take that away from me, you cut off my life. . . .

*Laura.*—Why did we not separate in time?

*Captain.*—Because the child bound us to each other; and the bond became a chain.

The child, the product of love, in which the parents see a continuation of their personalities, becomes a bond that knits them even closer to each other; but later, when love has fled, a chain that fetters.

When one has sacrificed his whole life for one's child, one is sure to demand the same sacrifice from the offspring. The parent is then, in fact, no longer capable of looking upon his child as a being in itself, an individuality with its own life to lead. And so there arises in this family a rivalry for the soul of the child; each of the parents wants to win her for himself, to implant in the child's mind a hatred for the other. For the child embodies the "conception of immortality," as the Captain puts it,

and if that is taken away from him, his very life is cut off.

Hence the passionate pleading of the Captain for the love of his daughter. "You have two souls, and you love me with one and hate me with the other. But you must only love me! You must have only one soul, otherwise neither you nor I will ever have peace. You must have only one mind; *you must have only one will—my will.*" In other words, paternal love—which one would expect to be the highest form of self-denial—becomes here the crassest egotism.

Middle-class society, which prepares woman exclusively for marriage, commits the added sin of inculcating her with the moral notion that sexual desire is sinful and to be shunned. This introduces into the soul of woman a conflict which but too often renders her incapable of enjoying the natural impulses without restraint or reluctance. This attitude, in turn, produces a certain estrangement between the marital couple or greatly intensifies any existing causes for discontent. When, in the course of their altercation, the Captain asks his wife, "Do you hate me?" she replies, "Yes, sometimes! *When you are a man.*" That this reference is not merely to his status of social superiority, will be evident from what we shall say below.

Laura's hatred of man as a male is, in Strindberg, curiously interwoven with her keenly developed maternal love. Parents, when disappointed in love, try to find a substitute in their child. It may, however, happen conversely, that they transfer their dissatisfaction upon the child, as the disturber of their happiness. The result is the same in both



cases: either through a surfeit of tenderness or a scantiness of affections the children become excessively hungry for love. As adults they are equally hungry for love and seek in every woman the image of an affectionate mother. Women, on the other hand, who have been brought up in such circumstances, know only how to be mothers, but not lovers. This state of affairs is the outcome of an ethical system which aims to fit women solely for marriage, but looks upon erotic desires as sinful.

These considerations find a very apt illustration in Strindberg's tragedy.

*Laura.*— . . . Do you recall that I entered your life almost as a second mother? Your big, strong body lacked nerves; you were a giant child that was born either too soon or undesired.

*Captain.*—Yes, that was it. Father and mother did not wish to have me,—that's why I was born without a will. That's why I felt, when you and I became one, that I was adding to my stature. That's why I let you dominate; I who, in the barracks, before the troops, was a commanding officer, became your obedient slave. And I grew with you, looked up to you as to a more highly gifted being, and *obeyed you as if I had been your ignorant little child.*

*Laura.*—Yes, so it was then, and that's why I loved you as my child. But, you know—you saw it—as soon as your feelings changed their nature and you stood before me as a lover, I was ashamed, and your embrace brought with it a joy which was followed by the pangs of conscience, as if my very blood had felt shame. The mother turned into a paramour! Disgusting!

*Captain.*—I saw it but could not understand it. And as I thought I no-

ticed your contempt for my unmanliness, I wished to win your wisely favor by asserting my manhood.

*Laura.*—That was the mistake. The mother was your friend, but the wife becomes your foe, and love between the sexes is a struggle. . .

The love between this husband and wife represented a symbolic incest,—he was the son, she the mother. There seems to be an indication in the play from which it may be inferred that in the first years of their married life they refrained from cohabitation. For the Captain says to his wife, "We were married two years and had no children. You *best know why.*" When the husband ceases to be the child and becomes a man, his wife's love is transformed into hate and "the love between the two sexes becomes a struggle." The unrestrained hatred which she feels for him is the result of an extraordinarily strong sexual repression. Her inability to enjoy the pleasures of an embrace without afterwards experiencing pangs of conscience, poisons all the relations between husband and wife. It is but too natural for the Captain to exclaim in despair, "What became of love, wholesome, sensuous love?" . . .

Unfortunately for the Captain, the discords of married life awaken in him the insane notion that he may not even be the father of his child, that one cannot have adequate proof of one's paternity. The origin of this delusion is as follows:

One of his soldiers, Nojd, has become involved in a suit for alimony. The Captain, taking him to strict account, demands:

*Captain.*—In other words are you or are you not the father of the child?



*Nojd.*—How can a fellow tell that?

*Captain.*—How? Can't you tell?

*Nojd.*—No, Captain; one can never know that.

*Captain.*—Weren't you the only one with her?

*Nojd.*—Yes, at that time. But you never can tell if you're the only one! . . . You see it's like this . . . if I knew for a certainty that I am the father of the child . . . but, you see, one can never know that. And to skimp and slave all one's life for another fellow's child, that's no fun!

Nojd has here given utterance to a thought that may have been slumbering in the Captain's unconscious; no one wants to skimp and slave for another man's child—yet who can say with perfect assurance that he is the real father of a child? This idea acts as a hypnotic suggestion upon the Captain's mind, and its power over him is intensified by his wife's cunning. During an argument on the subject of their daughter, whom each one of them is bent on educating in accordance with his own notions, this colloquy ensues:

*Laura.*—What did Nojd want here?

*Captain.*—That's an official secret.

*Laura.*—One, however, that's known to everyone in the kitchen.

*Captain.*—Then surely you too know it.

*Laura.*—I do.

*Captain.*—And, no doubt, have already passed judgment?

*Laura.*—It's defined in the law books.

*Captain.*—But the law doesn't say who the child's father is.

*Laura.*—No, but usually that's ascertainable.

*Captain.*—Wise people maintain that one can never know.

*Laura.*—That would be remarkable! Isn't it possible to know who the father of a child is?

*Captain.*—Some say, no!

*Laura.*—That would be strange! How, then, can the father have such rights over his wife's child?

*Captain.*—He has them only in case he has taken over such obligations, or, one might say, has burdened himself with obligations. And in marriage there is no doubt as to the paternity.

*Laura.*—Isn't there?

*Captain.*—No, I hope there is not!

*Laura.*—But what if the wife is faithless?

*Captain.*—There is no question of that in this instance. . .

At another time, when the conflict about their daughter's education has taken a new form, the following conversation ensues:

*Laura.*—Do you think a mother would permit her child to go among wicked people and learn that everything her mother had implanted in her is sheer nonsense, and run the risk of having her daughter despise her all the rest of her life?

*Captain.*—And do you think that a father will permit ignorant and conceited women to teach his daughter that her father is a charlatan?

*Laura.*—It means less to the father.

*Captain.*—Why so?

*Laura.*—Because the mother is closer to the child, as it has been discovered that no one can know who the father of a child is.

The suggestive power of this casual notion becomes stronger and stronger. The Captain is now fully persuaded that he is not the father of his child. He even racks his brains for various theories



that might establish his delusion. He recalls that one day, after they had been married for two years, and had not had a child, he was ill with a fever and overheard his wife talking with her lawyer about his property. The lawyer was explaining to her that she could not inherit her husband's estate because they had no children and asked her if she was pregnant. After he recovered, they had a child. And now he demands that she confess her guilt:

*Captain.*—Free me from the uncertainty; tell me outright if it is true and I will forgive you beforehand.

*Laura.*—But I cannot acknowledge a transgression that I have not committed.

*Captain.*—What does it matter to you, when you know that I shall not divulge your secret? . . .

*Laura.*—If I say it is not true, you won't be convinced; but if I tell you that it is, will you be convinced? You wish, then, that it were true?

The delusion corresponds, apparently, to a definite desire on the part of the Captain: he wishes that his wife had been untrue to him. Intellectually he knows that his doubts concerning the child's paternity are unfounded. "That is the horrible part of it!" he says. "If there were some reasons for my suspicions I would have something tangible, something to which I could hold on. But this way *they are only shadows*, wraiths that lurk in the thickets and put their heads forth to mock me. . . ." These words comprise the whole psychology of mania: A suspicion may lack all rational foundations, one may see that for oneself, and yet believe it. In other words, the "shadows" are treated as realities. Why? Because the "shadows" express a thought that is strongly endowed with

emotion. Hence the Captain's remark to his wife: "Do you think that I would want to be responsible for another man's child if I were convinced of your guilt?" The delusion had a definite purpose: to assist the Captain in ridding himself of his paternal privileges without any pangs of conscience.

At the first glance Strindberg's tragedy gives the impression of being a drama of purpose, a thesis written to prove to the world the malevolence of women. Whereas the man plays aboveboard and conceals none of his plans, the woman is ever plotting. She arrays his friends and acquaintances against him by spreading false reports about his mental condition. She tells the physician incredible tales, in order to represent the Captain as insane. Caught in her nets, the poor Captain is destroyed.

We do not intend to enter upon a defence of the woman; that does not concern us at present. Wherever one encounters exaggerated emotions it behooves one to be suspicious, to doubt their truth. A hatred for women is no exception to this rule. Nietzsche has found the explanation for misogyny when he said: "Whenever a man says to his fellowmen, 'Woman is our foe,' he manifests an unbridled lust that hates not only itself but also the means it employs." (*The Dawn of Morn*, Aphorism 346.) In fact, hatred must be regarded as the affective transformation of love, as a defensive reaction against eroticism. It has been shown above that the relations between the Captain and his wife partook of the nature of a symbolical incest. That this idea is typical of Strindberg's philosophy is manifested by his treatment of the same theme in his *A Fool's Confession* (an



autobiographical novel which was originally printed in German and was forbidden in Sweden). In this work Axel takes farewell from his beloved, but not before he has described his innermost feelings: "This moment brings back to me the sweet remembrance of the first days of our affection, when she was gracious and tender, *almost a wife and mother in one*, who petted and spoiled me as if I had been her little child. But I love her anyhow, yearn for her, and passionately long to make the passionate creature my wife. Is this an aberration of love? Am I the product of a whim of nature? Are my impulses unnatural, *because I would possess my mother?* Is this the unconscious incest of my heart?" Axel's relations to his beloved are of the same incestuous character as those of the Captain to his wife. With the significant exception that the Captain's incestuously colored love is repressed and the liberated sexual emotion is turned into hatred. (This problem of emotional transformation is treated at length in my *Grundzüge [Fundamentals] der Psychoanalyse*, Leipzig and Vienna, F. Deuticke, 1914, Chapter XII.)

The Captain meets his tragic end not merely thru his wife's perfidy but, in the last analysis, because he has not been able to free himself from the infantile forms of eroticism. Significant in this regard are the last scenes of the drama

in which the suffering Captain is treated by his old nurse as if he were still her infant charge. She reminds him how naughty he used to be and how he had to be coaxed into his clothes. "I had to promise that you should have a jacket of gold and be dressed like a prince. And then I took your little blouse that was only made of green wool and held it in front of you and said, 'In with both arms!' and then I said, 'Now just sit nice and still while I button it down the back!'" And with that she has put the straightjacket on the outwitted Captain. All had fled from him in sheer terror, but the old nurse has trapped and tamed him by the soothing tale of his childish experiences.

And, at the very end, before he breathes his last, the Captain calls old Margaret, "Come and sit near me on this chair. There. May I put my head on your lap? So!—this is warm! Bend over me so that I can feel your breast! Oh, it is sweet to sleep on a woman's breast, a mother's or a mistress's, but the mother's is the sweetest."

The tragic tangle of the play is the expression of an inner conflict. A man who is internally free can easily overcome outward obstacles. But the Captain cannot deal with women because in woman's world he still lives in the nursery. And this proves his undoing.

(Translated by A. Green, New York.)

## Displacement Substitution

By Dr. Wilhelm Stekel, *Vienna*

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In folk lore, which so often proves to be only a precipitate of hidden truths, the belief in a mysterious transmission of inner forces and disease products is tenaciously adhered to. Not only love and hate, but also diseases, destinies, death and life, can be handed over from one person to another. This superstition demands its victims to this day. I refer only to the disgraceful superstition that a dangerous infectious disease may be got rid of by transmitting it to another. Gonorrhoeal and luetic patients seek for "innocent virgins" or, what is even more shocking, young children to whom to transmit their disease in order to get rid of it. Many of the incidents reported in our newspapers and journals of criminology are attributable to this superstition. This is true also of the belief in the efficacy of various love potions and of other elixirs and foods prepared from certain bodily organs containing the excrements. Menstrual blood, semen, urine, faeces, nasal mucus, etc., are not infrequently employed as means of transmitting diseases and passions, and this not only among the lower classes.

A certain neurotic, a college man, told me he had mixed a few drops of his urine with some Liptauer cheese as a means of securing the love of his father's housekeeper. Patients have often told me of having drunk the urine of their sweethearts and got them to drink some of theirs as a means of making their union

permanent. The interesting thing about all this is that these actions were not the result of communication or instruction, as in the case of folk-lore, but of an obscure instinct.

The reader will find this theme discussed exhaustively in Krauss's *Anthropophyteia*. Literature is full of hints as to a belief in transmission. It is found most clearly in Jacobson's novel, *Zwei Welten*. There a very sick girl makes a wreath from lion's foot, withered rue, mildewed corncob, a lock of her hair and a sliver from a coffin. With this she waits at the river, for she can transmit her malady only to a girl passing by her in running water. A sailboat passes by, containing some young boys, laughing and chattering, and a beautiful girl at the mast. The sick girl throws the wreath into the water, pronouncing at the same time the wish that the strange girl may acquire her disease. She recovers her health—the novelist ascribes this to auto-suggestion—but her guilty conscience drives her to suicide. She throws herself into the water at the hour when the uninjured beauty again passes by her as a happy bride.

The belief that the dead can transmit their sufferings and their fates to the living is especially obstinate. I am treating an impotent man, aged 32, on whose birthday his uncle was assassinated. He and his whole family live in the conviction that the same fate awaits them, and



yet at times he thinks he must continue the life of the slain uncle.

The Greeks cherished a belief of being able to transmit wonderful forces, gifts, etc., through coitus. The (male) lover transmitted his soul and his virtue (in the Latin sense) through his semen and blew them into the beloved youth. We still entertain the belief that a baby imbibes various qualities from its nurse through her milk. I have often been told that I got my nurse's temperament that way.

The fact that a magnet can be charged, that electricity can be discharged into another body, has led Benedikt to the conviction that all parts of the body give off certain invisible substances (emanations) which can be transmitted to other persons. He has evolved a complicated hypothesis about transmission (*Verladung*) and claimed to be able to determine with his sidereal pendulum, by the aid of photographs, whether old "masterpieces" were genuine or not. (The reader who is interested in transmission as a telepathic phenomenon is referred to my [untranslated] pamphlet on 'telepathic dreams,' Berlin, 1920.) To telepathists and to some radiologists the idea of such transmission is quite familiar. It is possible that the belief in the possibility of a displacement [i. e., of finding a scapegoat] emanates from a knowledge of these facts slumbering in the folk-consciousness. Possibly! But I believe the matter has a different origin.

In the psychic life of naive persons displacement [*Verladung*] plays an important rôle. I was surprised to discover that without a knowledge of this mechanism many psychic phenomena were inexplicable. I discovered this during my analyses. The patients unload their old

desires on the physician. This is the phenomenon first discovered and described by Freud as "transference." Experience teaches that this transference of hatred and of love upon the physician is not peculiar to psychoanalysis. Analysis does not create the transference, it only "unveils" it, as Freud aptly says. Before I discuss the essential essence of transference, its causes and effects, I shall cite some particularly interesting examples of displacement.

In a family consisting of the parents and three boys there is a cat which constitutes the spiritual centre of the household. She is not only the avowed favorite but a kind of house-god. All vie for the cat's favor. At meals the cat sits on one or the other's shoulder; she is given the choicest morsels. All the conversation centres around the cat, her looks, her wants, etc. She is an inexhaustible stimulus for serious as well as frivolous discussion. All stroke her and call her by pet names. If the cat is absent from a meal there is painful tension; the members of the family look at each other perplexed, not knowing what to talk about. With the cat's aid this dead gap can be bridged. It is evident that to every one of these five persons the cat is a symbol. To the son she is the mother, to the mother the son. Everyone can unload his longings and his unfulfilled wishes upon the cat. Everyone can radiate upon her tenderness belonging to another. The cat also makes it possible for them to give expression to insults and certain liberties which really have for their object the person symbolised by her but which they would not permit themselves to express directly. One or the other pushes her away and says: "Get away, you good for nothing!" or: "You

beast!" etc. Thus love and hate, admiration and contempt, etc., are unloaded upon the cat which thus serves as a kind of lightning-rod for the emotions of the whole family and frustrates many an unpleasant scene.

We know that persons in a rage must suddenly break a cup, a plate, a vase, or something or other. This outburst occurs as a kind of lightning-like discharge. A man quarrels with his wife; hate fills his heart and he is impelled to assault her, perhaps even to kill her,—all hate is deadly. He seizes a plate onto which he has transferred his hatred; with all his might he throws it to the ground, smashing it into a thousand bits—and his hatred is dispelled. His mate has been destroyed vicariously through the object that has attracted to itself all his hostility.

The ancient Jews acted in accordance with this principle when they annually unloaded their hatred upon an innocent goat, the scapegoat, which they then stoned and drove out into the wilderness.

Unloading an incestuous desire upon another member of the family is very frequent. Harnik has pointed out that in our dreams the maid is a symbol for our mother. This is not wholly correct for I have found that the maid may also represent our sister or daughter. That boys often fall in love with the maid we know. The maid stands for their mother [or sister, etc.] I have known such love to cease when the maid left or was discharged. The transference was promoted by the conditions surrounding her. (In anal-erotica the w. c. plays an important and hitherto unsuspected rôle. The w. c., next to one's bed, is the most frequent locus for onanism. Associations with this small chamber make it difficult to

indulge in fantasies outside of a w. c.) I have known of cases in which men fell in love with the maid after they had brought about a displacement from their daughters. Any member of the household may become a scapegoat. I shall cite two characteristic instances of this.

A physician, 45 years old, enters into a relationship with the governess of his thirteen year old daughter. What attracts him most is the circumstance that, in spite of her forty years, she is still a virgin. (She was his wife's chum at school.) He indulges in all sorts of practices with her but is very careful not to deflower her. He indulges in cunnilingus; *stimulat clitoridem cum digitis, bibit urinam*. His mode of gratifying himself is essentially infantile. This regression to infantilism in an otherwise wholly normal person is due to the fact that he is in love with his own child. He transferred his affection upon the governess and did with her what he would have loved to do with his daughter.

The valet de chambre, who is a well-known source of danger to the daughters (and the sons too) of the household, is also now and then a displacement object and his triumphs are due to the circumstance that he has taken over the father's or brother's rôle.

A girl of 23, a bride, suffers from the distressing compulsive idea that she may lose her virginity. She fears all corners and edges lest they injure her hymen. She walks the streets with short, mincing steps; a large step might tear her hymen. A ride in a wagon is out of the question: the jolting might deprive her of her hymen. All sharp objects are a torture to her: they might somehow get under her clothes and bring about a laceration. The whole day is spent worry-



ing about her virginity. Innumerable compulsive ideas, to be described in detail on another occasion, occupy her time. Then too there is a fear of bathing and of spermatozoa: a man might have bathed in the tub, a spermatozoon might get into the vagina and result in conception. On the sofa and in the w. c. the same thing might happen. Hence she is compelled to discharge her duties standing. She is also afraid of pins and needles. She apprehends stickpins everywhere. One night she remained standing in her room all night because she was afraid to undress and go to bed, lest a pin somewhere in her clothing might become detached and penetrate her. I find the cause of her neurosis, among other factors, in a pathological relationship to her step-father; he is a brutal, domineering, personality who terrorizes the whole household. He devours her with his lustful eyes. He waits till she is alone and then he bursts into her room and overwhelms her with his passionate kisses. He takes her in his lap and kisses her even in the presence of his wife and the other children. If he finds her in bed alone he plays with her breasts and kisses her—anywhere he can. I send for her mother and ask her to co-operate with me, calling her attention to the fact that her husband had forbidden the girl to lock the door to her room. The girl is unable to wash or dress inasmuch as she is always anticipating the step-father's intrusion. The wife is helpless.

Our analysis brings no improvement. I attribute this to the unchanged domestic conditions. The girl's doubts become daily more unbearable and her solicitude about her maidenhood assumes a grotesque character. This arouses my suspicions that she is no longer a virgin.

From my analysis of other cases of compulsion neurosis I know that often the patients doubt what they do not wish to remember. This is the annulment tendency which plays an important rôle in the neurosis,— a rôle which most analysts have not hitherto sufficiently appreciated. (See my essay on "Time and the Neurotic," in the *J. of Urology and Sexology*.) The patients annul an unpleasant reality and then behave as if they had blotted out this reality.

Is it possible that this girl had been deflowered and has annulled this fact so that she might play being afraid of losing her virginity, as if she had it to lose?

Emphatically I tell her she is not a virgin and demand that she tell me the circumstances attending the loss of her virginity. Thereupon she narrates the details of a coitus with a boarder into whose bed she had stolen at night. That's what the boarder told her bridegroom. Why hadn't she given herself to her bridegroom? Because he was not living in the house with her family. For decency's sake he was not living with them; but the boarder's room adjoined that of the stepfather—and this enabled her to make a displacement from him to the stepfather. She desired the father; at night she wished to go to him, was aroused by thoughts of him and displaced these impulses upon the boarder. After coitus she became afraid of pregnancy, then she apparently forgot this experience, i. e., she annulled the fact of the defloration and behaved as if she still had something to lose.

I have reported the above case for the purpose of demonstrating the displacement upon a member of the household.

The following is probably the most remarkable case of displacement:—Mr. T. B., act. 25, lawyer, is incapable of studying or of doing anything else. His chief complaint is that he has lost all libido. Three years ago matters were very different! It was then that he met the woman who is now his betrothed; he had then given her a single kiss and had felt a violent passion in so doing, and now all is quenched; he has no more passion. Things can never be right between him and his affianced; she is destined to be an "eternal bride." Now she rejects him, now he her, now he wants her, now he recoils from her, and so it goes. The worst of it is that he cannot resist the desire to masturbate and has no pleasure from coitus. Erections occur, but no emissions. He has already gone through a protracted analysis with Dr. H. who has not discovered his "specific onanism phantasies." Our patient admits he thinks of something but does not know of what. In the presence of women he has a feeling of inferiority. Who is responsible for this? Only his father. For it was he who had kept him from women, from all social contacts, and never permitted him to be out of his sight. Now the mischief was done. That was the product of his father's method of educating children! And he was a teacher by profession!

And so it went day after day. He never ceased complaining about his father and would have loved to bring him to an accounting. He indulges in fantasies of committing suicide and leaving his father a letter blaming him for having ruined his life. But our investigation proves that his father had always treated him affectionately; had been very strict with him but had never beaten him.

Our patient's mother died when he was three years old. His father did not remarry but devoted himself to his son's education. He is now 70 years old, somewhat infirm and slightly feeble-minded in consequence of an apoplectic stroke, and lives in the country. The patient is living in Vienna, alone in a large house which he is neglecting frightfully. Though he pays a lot of attention to his own appearance he is letting the house fall into frightful decay. Nothing is ever dusted and cobwebs are everywhere.

He is always in financial difficulties; he has no money and is not working. He lives on the sale of the household furniture; one piece after another finds its way to the second-hand dealers. Thereto he has lost all sense of the value of money and spends it foolishly. I note that his expenditures have a definite tendency: he wants to become poor in order that he may be driven to go to his father. At first I investigated his relations to his betrothed. It turns out that there is no betrothed; that the girl had told him she would have nothing to do with him; but he insists in considering himself bound. All this business about his betrothed was merely a kind of play. As soon as he thought the matter might become serious he withdrew. Finally the girl saw through him and sent him on his way. He really has no love for her but now and then works himself into a sentimental mood about her.

All his love is "fixed" on his father. Up to his sixteenth year he slept in one bed with him! It was his father's habit to hold the boy's legs between his, but there is no evidence of anything of a more intimate nature between the two. The boy was insanely jealous of the



cooks, the governess, etc. When he was about eight years old he awoke one night and found that his father was not with him; he jumped out of bed, began to scream, and looked for him in all the rooms except in the maid's. He felt dimly that his father was there. Suddenly his father appeared and said he had been in the dining-room. The deeper the analysis goes, the more evident his fixation on his father becomes. He had this fantasy: *I am in bed; a giant wants to bend over me and fondle my genitals but I give him a push so that he flies back and lands in such a position that both his legs are up in the air. I fall on him and push my hand in his anus and pull out a gold ring which I want to give my affianced in return for my freedom.* This means: I am fixed on my father, above all on his anus; if I could get free from him I could love a girl.

It appears, too, that a large part of his love for his father was displaced upon the residence. The w. c. is the special source of his greatest pleasures; next to his bed, it is the favorite place for onanism; it gets a large share of his affection (*pretium affectionis*) because his father so often sat there. The whole house is his father. A lady of his acquaintance has made him a very favorable proposition: she wished to rent a part of his home, pay him a good rental for it, do the necessary janitor work, provide his breakfast, etc. But he could not make up his mind to take her in. It seemed like a profanation to him, notwithstanding the fact that he often took girls to the house and attempted coitus with them. He wanted to free himself from his past by means of limitless indulgence but could not.

The displacement upon the "eternal bride" was even more conspicuous. The real eternal bride was his father; in spirit he had sworn eternal loyalty to him. He had resolved to devote his whole life to his father; they should always live together and even sleep together. He sought out an eternal bride when he became aware of his father's attachment to his last housekeeper. He wanted to make him jealous and thus save himself; but in the girl he found only a father substitute. He contrived matters so that his relationship to the girl ran parallel with that to his father; she was as unattainable as he and as cool towards him (because of his behavior, of course). He could neglect her, worship her from afar, rhapsodize about his unhappy love, consider himself betrothed, etc. Through her he could feel all sorts of feelings, emotions, jealousy, disappointment, etc., which really related to his father. But for all that, he was always careful that this displacement should not become too serious; he always maintained the distance necessary for his fantastic transposition.

But why was he so violently and unalterably hostile to his father? What impelled him to give his father so much pain and to pose as a lost son, as an example of improper education? We must remember that he never wrote his father a line, that he cherished the fixed idea of having a reckoning with him, and that he fumed with rage when he spoke to him.

The neurotic's well-known artistry came out during the analysis. There was not the slightest hint of the true cause of his attitude to his father. He tells us that the transformation came about three years ago after he had heard

a lecture on onanism by Forel. Of course he attributes his neurosis to onanism. Before that he had written his father daily; all his letters began with: "My dearest, kindest and most loving father." His father had suffered an apoplectic stroke, whereupon, like a good and devoted son, he got a furlough to visit his father. Only after that did he become hostile and then he would debate with himself for hours whether he ought to address his father as "my dearest," etc. Finally his hostility became so intense that he wrote only the initials: M. d. k. a. m. l. f., as a routine formula.

The analysis brought out the truth: he was jealous. His father had forsaken him and was living in the country with his housekeeper. The faithless one had thereby ruined his life-plan. And what was this plan? It was childish enough,—the fixed idea of an infantile personality, which was clung to with all the obstinacy of a child. "I would live with my father and take the place of a wife to him." Fellatio fantasies were associated with this identification with a woman. In his memory there lived the recollection of the golden time when he was permitted to sleep with his father. Had he then dreamed of love scenes or had something of the kind really happened? That was unascertainable. Certain neurotic symptoms, including doubts about various past occurrences, seemed to point to the latter alternative. He was now suffering from the cruel hatred of a despised and betrayed lover. During his onanistic activities he would lie in bed in the same position he had occupied while sleeping with his father, and even used the same bed.

When his displacement was brought

to light the "eternal bride" lost her value for him; only the residence remained to witness his former happiness and as the object of his displacement. And how about his physicians? Everyone of his physicians became a father-image from whom he hoped to get those manifestations of affection which he still hoped to get from his father.

He was the type of individual Freud described in his suggestive brochure, *Jenseits des Lustprinzips*. He is always re-enacting the same scene. The meaning of this game is that he wants to convert a passive experience into an active one. That was the meaning of his fantasy of having overcome a giant and of extracting a ring from his anus. (The Nibelungen ring!) This is confirmed by a recollection which may be a covering-memory. After his tenth year he wanted all his governesses. In his fourteenth year he was discovered by his father in an erotic escapade with a maid. A scene followed. He thinks he recollects that this girl once approached his bed, raised the cover and wanted phallum in manum capere. He pushed her away. He was evidently stronger then than he had been in the years of his early experiences with his father. We are evidently dealing with a fantasy. The patient reported also this recollection: It seems to me as if . . . He had also had fantasies of coitus with all the women who had befriended his father. And now he is on very friendly terms with the present housekeeper, of whom he is extremely jealous. Behind it is an old fantasy of sharing a woman with his father. It all means that he has made a displacement from his father to women.

We see in this case a clear instance of Freud's "tendency to repetition." He



makes fathers of his physicians, gets into opposition with them because they too disappoint him and do not heed his infantile yearning: "Oh, that he played with me!" He is always charging his father with not having played with him or bought him playthings. After the analysis he freed himself from the "eternal bride" who had ceased to be of significance to him when he saw that she was only a father-substitute.

Extremely common and therefore well-known are the instances of displacement from a homosexual to a heterosexual object. These cases occur chiefly during the stage of transference in an analysis, but they occur also in other circumstances and are usually overlooked by the analyst because he does not realize that he is dealing with a displacement phenomenon. The following will demonstrate this:

A man of 34 is under treatment for obsessive doubts. (This case is fully described in my volume on 'impotence in the male' in the chapter on 'the neurotic's relationship to time'.) He is in love with a woman with whom he has had a relationship for years. For moral reasons he wants to marry her. Unfortunately his potency is very variable; most frequently he discharges prematurely. (Potency normal in onanism, although he indulges in this less frequently than formerly and, ostensibly, only with heterosexual fantasies.) He decides on matrimony but is immediately tortured by doubts. He discovers all sorts of defects and obstacles and he recoils. His friends and relatives are consulted and advise marriage. Thereupon he becomes engaged, but the very next day he breaks the engagement. A few months later this foolery is repeated. He comes to

me for treatment, saying he cannot live without his beloved. In consternation he discovers he is wholly impotent and is resolved to be married as soon as his potency is restored. Of course such a condition makes potency as well as marriage impossible.

Our analysis shows that we are dealing with a case of displacement from homosexuality to heterosexuality: he is in love with a (male) friend. A certain similarity between his friend and the affianced made this displacement possible. (Particular interest attaches to cases in which there is a displacement upon inanimate objects. The most suitable objects for such displacement are dolls, articles of furniture, collections of books, stamps, etc., letters, jewelry, and other objects belonging to the person beloved. Among displacement objects none plays a more conspicuous role than a cushion. I shall describe only a few forms of this displacement, contenting myself with pointing out that other objects, especially instruments, e. g., an irrigator, may function in the same capacity. Many infantile persons suck at the tip of a cushion or pillow, and many neurotics cannot fall asleep without holding the tip of their pillow between their teeth and sucking away at it. [Oral erotism?]) In these cases the pillow is substituted for the mother's or nurse's breast. Others embrace the pillow, or keep stroking it, or clasp it between their legs, etc., as if it were a beloved person. To one of my patients the pillow replaced a horse and as such it played an important role in his fantasies.)

The next case is even more remarkable. An impotent man of 36 suffered from peculiar abdominal pains which

were relieved only if he lay on his abdomen before he fell asleep and pressed the cushion firmly against his "tummy." In his dream the pillow gets displaced and he awakes holding it between his arms; it is a sister-substitute.

Many patients can sleep only in their own beds and if they have their own pillows. Often the pillow is punished, beaten, and even thrown to the floor angrily. Especially in dreams does the pillow serve as a vent for pent up hatred and many a pillow found on the floor in the morning witnesses silently to violent quarrels and conflicts in dreams in which the pillow served as a displacement object [i. e., as a substitute].

A man of 42 had the habit of playing with his childhood toys occasionally. One day he resolves to give all these toys to his nephew and thus free himself from his past. Among these playthings is a little clown who had been his favorite; it was his darling and he used to have women's dresses made for it. In his childhood he could not eat or go to bed without it and he spent many hours with it. Even as an adult man he had to play with it. The doll held a prominent place in his room and was kept in a glass case. On certain holidays the doll was taken out, assigned a seat at the table, little dishes were placed before it and food was served it. He was so insanely jealous of this doll that no one was ever permitted to touch it; to permit anyone to play with it was utterly out of the question. Our analysis disclosed the remarkable fact that the clown was a mother-symbol; upon it he transferred all the emotions he felt for his mother. Even though he was very cool to his mother, owing to jealousy of his brothers and sisters, he could

always be affectionate and tender to the little clown. He kissed it and overwhelmed it with pet names. After the analysis he gave it away.

Analysts know of this phenomenon and call it transference. But *transference*, the discovery of which will immortalize Freud, is only a special instance of displacement and the term should be used only to describe the relations between the analyst and his patient during the course of a psychoanalysis. One notes during an analysis that patients save themselves from their transference upon the analyst by displacing the affects upon some other objects. They begin to collect (books, stamps, fans, pictures, etc.), fall in love, try to make new friends, or displace their emotion upon some object or other. (One of my patients fell in love with a painting.) These are persons who fly from any great emotion; they split it up and scatter it by displacement. At such a time men with a strong homosexual component are incapable of friendship with a man. Although considerations of all sorts draw them to a particular man, they withdraw themselves from him by all sorts of artifices and by transference upon other individuals who are thus, without any inner justification, elevated to the rank of friends.

It is deserving of careful investigation why it is especially during analysis that transference so easily takes place. Our female patients often declare themselves insulted to be told that their emotion is only a displacement and maintain stoutly that theirs is a genuine passion. This only proves how well the displacement has succeeded and that they have not been able to take this mechanism into consideration.



Love during analysis comes about as the result of several factors. The most important of these is the physician's comprehension. The patient feels that for the first time in his life he is understood. The French say "to love is to be understood!" The yearning to be understood is infinite. But to be understood also means to be psychically naked. A naked person knows that he is known. That is why the Bible employs the word to "know" for to "cohabit". . . . A second factor is mankind's fear of being lonesome. This is intimately connected with being understood. One who feels that he is understood is no longer lonesome. (Storm says: "Love is at bottom nothing else than the fear of being lonesome.")

Finally a factor which has not yet been referred to has to be taken into consideration. Every patient harbors within his breast a certain scene upon the fulfilment of which his happiness depends. This is the categorical sexual imperative which is obstinately linked up with a definite fantasy. The patient draws the following conclusion: if the physician understands me so well he will know what I expect of the world and of him. His love is, therefore, the anticipation of fulfilment. (The tendency to anticipate!) Many an insuperable resistance during analysis is due to the fact

that the analyst does not realize that the patient has set his heart on the realization of that specific scene. In the displacement the specific fantasy was projected upon the physician.

The law of displacement explains many social phenomena. The displacement upon large and small (Freud) make it possible to displace upon a totality and upon a symbol of the totality. We may always discover the neurotic's mimetic nature and his playing with his affects and impulses. They are more than actors; they are jugglers who trick themselves.

The phenomenon of displacement is of especial importance in cases of psychosexual infantilism. To the child the whole world is animated; there are no dead things,—everything lives and loves. From it warm love radiates upon the whole world which it illumines and fructifies with its rays. Its fiery beams give warmth and life to all the planets. The Neurotic is eternally a child. To love is to find oneself in another. An infantile person can love everything, great and small, because he transplants them into himself. He is a ring, a pillow, a clown, a cat, a dog, as well as father and mother. Displacement is an outpouring of the ego-rays into the large and small world.

*(Translated by S. A. Tannenbaum)*

## A Case of Hysteria Analysed

(Continued from Page 141)

By S. A. Tannenbaum, M. D., New York

The theoretical interpretation of Mrs. A's case that I have given (p. 141.) is based on certain assumptions which the orthodox Freudians look upon as "facts" but the truth of which has not yet been proved and cannot be proved—because they are not facts. These assumptions are, in the main, as follows: that certain phenomena, labelled as "neurotic," cannot be explained without the assumption of unconscious mental processes; that these processes are unconscious desires; that these unconscious desires are of a "sexual" nature; that the patient is not and cannot become conscious of these desires because they have never been in consciousness or have been "repressed" from consciousness and are kept out of consciousness by the censure; that the repressed desires manifest themselves indirectly or symbolically in some organ or function associatively related to the original desire, and that the organ thus affected is an erogenous zone. In what follows I shall show that the case of Mrs. A does not bear out any of these assumptions and that her symptoms can be explained without resorting to them. Incidentally I shall point out some of the more fundamental errors involved in the Freudian theories.

According to Freud, mankind is capable of unconscious mental operations which differ from conscious mental operations in several important respects,

above all in not being endowed with emotions and in being incapable of entering the focus of awareness. But as one reads the literature on this subject and hears the patients' narratives one gets the conviction that all the so-called "unconscious" ideas, desires, or motives are not at all unconscious, that the subjects are aware of them or can be made to recall them after varying degrees of effort. Some people may not be as observant as others and may easily overlook their mental processes, but training will enable any fairly intelligent person to focus in his mind's eye, to become distinctly aware of mental processes which the Freudians designate as unconscious. Furthermore, to explain certain mental processes, e. g., the operation of the instincts, by referring them to the unconscious is an unscientific make-shift; it only puts the explanation a step further back, for we are not told what this unconscious is, why it is unconscious or how it operates. It is improbable to the point of being unthinkable that mankind should be endowed with two kinds of mental processes—conscious and unconscious—agreeing with each other in so many respects, while differing in others. That there are certain psychical phenomena which it is difficult to explain by the concepts of so-called "scientific psychology", i. e., the accepted psychology of the schools, is no warrant for as-



suming that the further study of "psychology" (i. e., "the psychology of the conscious," as opposed to "psychoanalysis" or "the psychology of the unconscious") will not in time find explanations for these phenomena. We may be nearer to it than we think. Psychoanalysis has pointed the way, has brought many neglected facts to light and has created a technique which will enable psychologists to ferret out the secrets of the mind's (not minds') workings. Increasing observation and study of neurotic persons during the past ten years has convinced me that "the unconscious," as defined by Freud, does not exist, and that if we search "the conscious" carefully enough it will not be necessary to take refuge in "the unconscious."

Neurotics and others—and who is not neurotic?—may derive a great deal of comfort from having their "baser" motives, their egotism, their selfishness, their sensual cravings, their lust for power, their greediness, their covetousness, their revengefulness, their treacherous natures, etc., attributed to their "unconscious" and being told that they are not to "blame" for what nature endowed them with, that they got ill in behalf of an idealism contending with these baser elements in their natures. And such a procedure may result in freeing some of the invalids from their symptoms, but this therapeutic effectiveness does not prove the truth of the theory taught them while the cure was being brought about. Besides, it is more than questionable whether mankind is benefited by this sort of whitewashing of its natural impulses. The truth alone can make mankind free from the sufferings they bring on themselves by their common human motives. They must be made aware not

of the nature of these impulses,—these they know,—but of their responsibilities in connection with them. Mrs. A did not consciously love her husband and unconsciously hate him. She hated him with as much hate as she could permit herself. She is 50 years old, a plain Jane, possessed of a son she dotes on and is dependent upon her husband for support. She could not act differently than she did. True, she pretended she wanted a divorce, but it was only to tie her husband to her the more. She knew the man she was dealing with. The mere thought of his leaving her almost "made her crazy." (She awoke in terror from dreams in which he had abandoned her.) She was sickened by the realization of her failure to make a satisfactory wife and by the danger of his leaving her. One night she had feigned sickness as a means of terrifying Mr. A, and she now used her illness to bring him to her feet. But there was never any doubt in her mind about her hatred of him, even tho she hated at times to admit it, or that she was tricking him. She took advantage of her illness to get him back; she did not become ill because of an unconscious purpose having this end in view. She did not fly into a neurosis as a means of accomplishing a hidden purpose.

One who has practised psychoanalysis strictly according to rule for as many years as I have knows that for the sake of therapeutic success, or in vindication of his theories, the analyst often has to resort to certain subterfuges. That he is sincere in them does not make them any the less subterfuges. The most common of these is the use of words in more than one sense. Thus we find Freud himself using "unconscious" for "instinct-

tive," "foreconscious," "hidden" and "unaware," according to the needs of the occasion. "Repressed" (i. e., forced out of consciousness into the "unconscious") is constantly being used as a synonym for "suppressed" (i. e., concealed from the auditor.) "Desire," or "wish" is over and over again substituted for "impulse," "instinct" and "conative trend." When a "desire" cannot possibly be drawn from a patient or dreamer, e. g., where a fear is manifest, he is charged with being a masochist or is told that the hidden desire is that the feared thing may not happen. The word "sexuality" is juggled with almost more than any other word in the psychoanalytic armamentarium. It is usually defined as a kind of erotism, as a something different from the sexual (procreative) impulse, "genitality," but in the end it always turns out to be our old friend—the sexual impulse; and, as a matter of fact, the word ("sexual" or "erotic") is employed solely because of its connotations in the patient's mind. The reduction of a symptom to a sexual manifestation, the invariable Freudian practice, serves to do away with the symptom only because the patient disapproves or is ashamed of what is "sexual." Another word that lends itself well to this kind of equivocation is the word "libido." Now it means "interest," "desire," then "urge," then "the life impulse" and finally, "the sexual impulse." This is, of course, a tremendous weapon in the analysts hands,—with its aid he can "sexualise" almost any symptom, especially with the aid of the theory of "erogenous zones." Theoretically we speak of "ego impulses" and of "sexual impulses", but in practice even the most egotistic impulses are interpreted in terms of the libido theory.

According to the Freudians, anxiety or apprehension, the most common symptom in the psychoneuroses, is the conscious manifestation of a repressed sexual wish. In other words, the repressed (tabooed) wish comes back from the unconscious in the shape of apprehension, anxiety or fear. Some psychoanalysts, unable to conceive of an emotion (desire) being converted into another (fear), interpret neurotic fear as the reaction to repressed desires. The neurotic individual, they say, is afraid of what he desires. But this is not the orthodox view, and it is tolerated by the orthodox only if the "desires" are conceded to be sexual desires. To Stekel nervous fear is always the fear of death. He also maintains that nervous fear, "anxiety," is the fear of oneself. Jelliffe (*l. c.*) defines it as the desire for immortality, and latterly Freud has very ingeniously defined "anxiety" as the fear of one's libido. According to Adler anxiety is the manifestation of the individual's failure to compensate for some structural or functional inferiority which interferes with the attainment of one's life-wish of self-maximization. The analyst who has not committed himself to any one school of psychoanalysis knows that neurotic fear is of many kinds. In some patients the apprehension emanates directly from something in their lives which justifies the emotion they feel. This is especially true, for example, of men whose business transactions are not quite within the law or who are anticipating financial disaster, of women whose private lives will not bear close scrutiny and who apprehend discovery, of secret political agitators who apprehend arrest, of persons in positions of trust who have yielded to temptation, etc. In many, neurotic fear is the direct expression of a



sense of guilt or sinfulness and the anticipation of punishment by God, society or the law. In many, it is the anticipation of failure to achieve their ideal, to accomplish their "great historic mission" (Stekel), to establish for themselves or maintain a position in society, in the church, in the movement, etc. In still others it is a fear of their mental integrity or sanity, present and future. In almost all persons it is the expression of the feeling of uncertainty or helplessness in the conflict with fate. "Shall I ever achieve this?" or "Shall I ever get out of this miserable situation?" is most of the times the question behind nervous apprehension. In some patients this manifests itself not as fearfulness but as depression. A painful situation from which there seems to be no escape, which threatens to restrain and curb the individual's egotistic or sexual impulse, almost inevitably results in morbid apprehensions or (and) depression. The consciousness of "wicked" or "unholy" emotions also may result in apprehension. Repression and transformation of repressed affects have nothing to do with it.

Turning our attention now to Mrs. A, we may say, without hesitation, that nothing in her history warrants our saying that she was more afraid of death or longed for immortality more ardently than is proper to a healthy human being. Her sexual impulses—libido, if you will—were quite normal;—when she and her husband were on good terms, when she was sure that he was hers, she enjoyed coitus and some of its preliminaries, at least as much as the average healthy religious woman does. She was always there when her husband wanted her, and "after the crash" she even enjoyed his perverse advances. It was only when his

conduct infuriated her that she "froze up" and repelled his erotic advances. She always craved for love and, knowing her man, was willing to make some concessions to him as a means of keeping him; but she did not know him well enough, did not know that his sexual constitution differed from hers, that human nature is not what it is conventionally supposed to be. He, on the contrary, it must be admitted, was quite a normal man. Love overcomes modesty and squeamishness. He loved her and showed it; but she was not sure of him and rejected his amorous attentions. We know that she spoke of a separation even before she discovered his infidelity. Why did the thought occur to her? Because she sensed that they were drifting apart, that she was not "making good" as a wife, that she never had made good, and that a break was coming. She anticipated the inevitable and was afraid. (All her life she had been ruled by fear—because all her life, allowing for a certain amount of rhetorical exaggeration, she had been in a conflict with fate.) How much she dreaded losing her husband is clearly indicated by her statement that even dreaming of being abandoned by him almost made her crazy. She had to keep him to enable her to retain her self-respect and self-esteem. The humiliation of losing him would have been more than she could bear.

A Freudian might, of course, say that her great dread of losing her husband really meant a repressed desire to lose him—to be rid of him—to have him die. This interpretation would be based on what I may call the "principle of opposites," the principle that dream-fear is a mask for repressed desire, and the greater the fear the greater the desire. This

principle, like many other psychoanalytic principles (e. g., transposition, displacement, projection, reversal), is evoked by the orthodox on the theory that the dream must represent the disguised fulfilment of a repressed wish. The wish-fulfilment theory must be saved at all costs. Most psychoanalysts do not seem to be aware of the fact that now not even Freud regards all dreams as wish-fulfilments. He speaks of punishment dreams—perhaps on the theory that the dreamer wishes unconsciously to punish himself (and yet he rejects Stekel's idea of repressed piety!)—and certain dreams due to his new-found instinct for repetition. (Mrs. A often dreamt of being deserted!) But Mrs. A did not repress her hatred of her husband, she knew perfectly that tho she hated him at times, on the whole she loved him. Her instincts and her sense told her that he was the biggest thing in her life, for her the sun rose and set with him, without him her life would be a mere void. His death would not profit her at all. To interpret her dream as a wish for his death, would not have helped our patient in the least,—she was not the kind of woman to be horrified at the thought that she was so selfish as to desire her husband's death. Besides, why should any person be shocked into health by being told that she harbors an *unconscious* wish for which she is not responsible? "The baby of a girl" might be horrified into altering her attitude toward her husband but not a woman of Mrs. A's experiences. My interpretation of her dream was based on the obvious fact that all of us are just as apt to dream about our desires as about our fears, our doubts as our convictions, etc. Whatever occupies our minds intensely, whatever we

happen to be thinking about before we fall asleep, whatever train of ideas is stirred up by something without or within us during sleep or just prior to sleep, may find expression in our dreams, sometimes literally and directly but most often indirectly or symbolically. These considerations among others, including the patient's "history," determined me to interpret Mrs. A's dream as a vivid visualization of how utterly forsaken and helpless and alone she would be in the world if her husband left her. That is why in these dreams he always took her to a desert or a high mountain (rocky, precipitous). And it must be borne in mind that Mrs. A had these dreams before she came to me for treatment and that I had said nothing to her up to this time about dreams.

But isn't it possible that even with this interpretation we can read a wish into the dream? With even a little ingenuity and a sufficiently elastic definition of the word "wish" or "desire", the dream can undoubtedly be twisted into a "symbolic" representation of a latent wish, as, for example: "It would serve me right if Mr. A abandoned me," or, by turning the dream around: "It would serve him right if I left him!" or: "If he left me I could resume my acquaintance with X" (the married man who still likes her and of whom she dreams sometimes), etc. But she does *not* wish any of these things, and I fail to see how it would benefit her to try to convince her that she did. The realization that even in her dreams she could not bear the idea of his leaving her did her more good; it helped her to shape her conduct so as to reunite her to him. She talked of leaving him, of compelling him to marry Julia—and then she married him



"for eternity;" and even after that she continued to bully him, because she knew that that made him woo her and get on his knees before her. She knew her man.

Dreams do undoubtedly often represent the imaginary fulfilment of wishes, sometimes (perhaps often) of "repressed" wishes. But they just as undoubtedly often represent the occurrence ("fulfilment") of our fears. These wishes and fears may relate to either our past, present or future. The fact is that we do not stop thinking when we fall asleep; the thoughts that occupy our minds just before we fall asleep are carried over with us into our sleep and there represented (thought of) pictorially. In other words, our thinking in dreams is exactly like that described by Silberer in his illuminating studies on the autosymbolic phenomenon. Because of the conflict between the wish to sleep and the wish to think, and because of the fact that our attention is at a low ebb and that with sleep the rationalizing faculty is in abeyance, our "thinking" goes on almost exclusively in accordance with the law of associations. (We see this even in our fantasies by day.) By virtue of time, place and sound associations, etc., all sorts of heterogeneous memories are stirred up and represented to the mind pictorially, —and this constitutes most dreams, a congeries of loosely associated memory pictures. Inasmuch as all our life is bound up with wishes of all sorts, wishes —and even forbidden ("repressed") wishes—may thus get into our dreams, just exactly as fears, doubts, reflections, trivial thoughts, etc., may. We dream because we are alive and have brain cells, not because we wish to sleep. We are never, or only rarely so profoundly asleep

that we do not know we are sleeping and dreaming; that is why we are often able to awake from unpleasant dreams,—they make the sleep too distressing. There is no warrant for the assumption of a censureship that always stays awake to keep our dreams pure, that sounds the alarm and wakes the sleeper when a repressed wish is eluding the censureship and entering the dream insufficiently masked. When we consider the infinite deal one dreams in a night, it is the height of absurdity to pretend to be able to find in the infinitesimal fragment recollected in the morning the dream inciter and the repressed wish and the infantile material on which the dream was based. Any idea carried far enough or juggled with sufficiently can be made to lead to tabooed and infantile material. Of course sexual matters get into our dreams and are represented symbolically. Why should they not? Sexual thoughts occupy an extremely important place in the thoughts of mankind and are always clamoring for expression, especially when the mind is not attent on more immediate and pressing problems. It is certain too, for obvious reasons, that sexual ideas are most actively assertive at night. That they are expressed symbolically is due to the fact that the sleeping or hypnoid mind cannot think any other way about anything.

After this preliminary and necessarily brief statement of my views on dreams, I am ready to enter into a detailed study of Mrs. A's symptoms. Her insomnia presents no difficulties. It is perfectly obvious that she could not fall asleep at night because she was unable to shake off her great problem: what to do under the circumstances? Should she give up her husband and did he still love

her? Could she go on living with a man who did not love her, whom she often hated, who perhaps loved another woman? Was she responsible for what had come upon her? Could she regain his love? What would become of her and her son if she and her husband parted? Was her husband's philosophy of life right? Was there something wrong with her sexual constitution and her ideas on sex? etc., etc. To me this is so obvious an explanation for her distressing insomnia that I can find no justification for thinking that she could not fall asleep because she did not (unconsciously) wish to sleep (in accordance with the wish-fulfilment theory), and that she did not wish (unconsciously) to sleep because she (unconsciously) feared to dream of her repressed (unconscious) hatred of her husband or Julia or Ada, or of her repressed (unconscious) perverse cravings (which she may have had), or of her incestuous desire for her son (which she may also have had). That my analysis, combined with her recovery of her husband's love, cured her—more scientifically speaking, let us say "was followed by the disappearance"—of her insomnia, she has told us unequivocally. Whether it would have done her more good or whether it would have been more scientific to sexualize her insomnia, to fit it into Freud's libido theory, I leave to the reader's judgment. That in an occasional case sleep and sleeplessness may have a sexual significance I do not deny. But the reader must bear in mind that even though we can establish the presence of forbidden sexual or criminal fantasies in a person who does not sleep well, it does not follow that these fantasies and the insomnia are related to each other as cause and effect.

Mrs. A's depression surely is comprehensible in the light of her life-history even without any reference to possible "repressed" impulses. We could of course speak of her depression as the surface reaction to her repressed desire to kill her husband, to kill Julia, to kill Ada, to enter upon a career of prostitution (the Freudians tell us all women have a "prostitution complex") after being abandoned by her husband, to indulge in perversions (fellatio, cunnilingus), to gratify her anal erotism, (she admits being "stingy"—an infallible index of the "anal-erotic complex"), to satisfy her homosexual urge ("proved" by her jealousy), to gratify her narcissistic craving ("proved" by the fact that she wanted to become a public speaker, loves to read to her family, mimics people), and so forth. In fact, there is not a single vice or "complex" that we could not "prove" against Mrs. A if we were inclined to do so, if we found it necessary to do so, and if we were as easily satisfied as to what constitutes "proof" as Freud and the Freudians (to say nothing of the other "schools") are. We might even speak of Mrs. A's depression as the result of disturbances in the internal secretions and we might have fed her on tablets or capsules containing extracts of all the ductless glands,—but this would not have been a whit more scientific than the Freudian technique, even though she had happened to get well while she was taking her tablets. Disturbances in the functions of the ductless glands may, and probably do, cause nervous and physical disturbances, but they do not cause psychoneuroses. But it is unquestionable too that psychoneuroses not infrequently, perhaps necessarily, result in disturbances in the func-



tions of the ductless glands. The causes for Mrs. A's unhappiness are so apparent that to invoke other factors, especially such as cannot be scientifically demonstrated, would be pedantic supererogation, if nothing worse.

But what about Mrs. A's distinctly hysterical symptoms: the paresthesia (numbness, pain or what not) in the cheek, lips and tongue, and the sensation of being choked? Can these be explained in terms of purely conscious psychology? Or must we, owing to a faith in a law of psychic determinism, resort to Freudian, i. e., "unconscious", mechanisms? Can these symptoms become comprehensible on any other theory than the theory of "repressed desires" and compromises? These questions we shall answer presently.

In all languages and among all people, from time immemorial, a large number of ideas have been expressed metaphorically in terms of the body and its functions. These somatic metaphors are extremely common in the every day speech of humanity the world over and may be designated as somatizations. By way of illustration I shall cite only the familiar "I can't see it" as meaning "I cannot understand it;" "to see clearly" means "to understand;" "to wink at" is "to ignore;" "to blink" is "to deceive," etc. Such conversions, it need hardly be said, occur not only in the ocular but also in the olfactory, auditory, gustatory, tactile and other spheres. These metaphoric expressions are not mere phrases, mere analogies; they are literal statements of facts, embodiments of ideas. An inability or unwillingness to see does under circumstances cause a blurring of the vision; a person who is conscious of an intention to deceive another does under

circumstances blink his eyes, modify his voice, and in other ways modify his body; an unwillingness to hear does under circumstances cause a momentary deafness; being psychically offended by someone or something does under circumstances cause nausea (hence the expression "I can't stomach him," etc.); a German-speaking individual intending to cheat another may under circumstances become aware of being dizzy (the German words for "to cheat" and "to be dizzy" being identical in sound); a woman carrying on a flirtation may under circumstances become "giddy"; a person may actually feel a sudden, sharp, stinging pain in the region of the heart on being told something very painful (So Tubal "sticks a dagger" in Shylock's heart.); an unwillingness to do something may result in a temporary paresis or paralysis; the reluctance to say something may cause temporary speechlessness; a woman may suddenly become aware of a burning sensation ("burning shame!") if her attention is suddenly called to a spot on her neck where her lover's kiss left a mark; an insult which one has to "swallow" may cause a choking sensation (globus hystericus); a sudden realization of being penniless may give rise to a feeling of intense physical weakness; grief makes the heart feel heavy; a "sickening" idea causes nausea; life weariness causes loss of appetite; insincerity makes the eyes shifty; etc. (Last year, on the occasion of my first flight in an aeroplane, I was the victim of a curious somatization. While 1000 feet above the North Sea I suddenly smelt smoke; on looking about me to see where the smoke came from, I realized that we were going through a cloud and that there was no smoke about. I explain

this phenomenon thus: owing to the novelty of my situation, I had translated an unfamiliar optical impression into an olfactory sensation;—what my eyes saw required me to smell smoke. Many hallucinations are such somatizations, e. g., the drunkard's "snakes.") Every reader can multiply these examples a thousand-fold. It is one of the essential characteristics of a living sentient human being to give to his ideas such somatic expression when he is under the influence of emotions or bodily or mental states that interfere with merely ideational or verbal cognition or expression. There will be no difficulty in understanding this if the reader will think of the parallel phenomenon described by Silberer as the auto-symbolic phenomenon. Psychoneuroses in the psychic sphere, i. e., phobias and compulsions, are caused in exactly the same way as these conversion hysterias and they may also be considered as somatizations because they are accompanied with somatic symptoms expressive of and harmonizing with the fixation of the idea at the basis of the neuroses. The reader will have no difficulty in comprehending this process if he will bear in mind the fact, noted by all psychoanalysts, that analysed symptoms turn out to be puns and word-plays. (See, for example, the numerous examples of this in the article by Dr. Stromme in this issue of *Psyche and Eros*.) I had an inkling of this long ago when I said that the unconscious takes literally what the conscious takes symbolically, and vice versa. What I did not then know and what the psychoanalysts have failed to realize is that the genesis of these neurotic phenomena had nothing to do with criminal or sex-

ual desires, with "repression" or with unconscious mental processes in the Freudian sense. Such "forbidden" desires may have been present at the moment of the neurotic fixation and symbolization, and may even have been responsible for the psychic state which made such a fixation possible, but this is a very different matter from the repressed desires of which the individual is not, has not been and cannot be, conscious and of which the psychoanalysts speak.

As I see it, Mrs. A's sensations of choking were somatizations of her occasional impulses to choke her husband. Every time she became angry at him she was impelled to fly at his throat and choke the life out of him, and every time this happened she became aware of symptoms of choking. To a large extent this is a perfectly normal phenomenon and bears a strong resemblance to the so-called "conditioned reflex." (A patient of mine, suffering from a psychoneurosis, narrates that once, while engaged in writing a short story, as she got to the point of describing a man choking a woman, she herself felt the man's fingers so vividly as they closed around the throat, that she had to stop writing. It is worth mentioning that her lover once threatened to choke her.) Mrs. A's facial, labial and glossal numbness was a similar somatization of her repugnance and outraged sense of decency every time she thought of the objectionable practices to which her husband wished to make her a partner. To her numbness was in all probability a kind of death, a sort of lifelessness. She would probably have said (had I questioned her as to this) that she "went dead" at the thought of a possible fellatio or cunnilingua. As



a matter of fact, she did say she wondered she "didn't go numb all over." (She may have heard a good deal about numbness when her father-in-law was sick.)

But, it may be asked, cannot these symptoms be interpreted in accordance with the wish-fulfilment theory? Unquestionably they can. But—and this is the crux of the matter—the particular wish or wishes read into the symptom will depend wholly on the ingenuity of the interpreter. Psychoanalysts would have no hesitation in "interpreting" the numbness of the face, etc., as reactions to (punishment for) a repressed desire for fellatio, or as the negative of this desire; and they would be sure in this connection to speak of cutaneous, labial and glossal erotism and then to connect up the symptoms with the nutritional impulse of early infancy. The choking sensation would be explained very much the same way. The objection to these interpretations, as to most of the Freudian interpretations, is that they are not founded on any tangible evidence, that they take for granted what they set out to prove and that there is no way of either proving or disproving them. These objections would apply, I need hardly add, even though it might be shown (what cannot be shown) that Mrs. A had occasional desires for what is carelessly called fellatorism. (When she and her husband were on good terms she submitted to his inclinations and promised to be even more complacent in future.) Nor would it help the psychoanalyst to appeal to the fact that a desire *oculari penem* is present in many, perhaps all women, even the healthiest, when in the embrace of the man they love. There is no warrant in logic for applying such a general proposition to an

individual case—especially when such a simple explanation as that we have offered is at hand.

This matter of the "wish" behind the symptom is deserving of a little additional comment. Not only does the particular wish that is discovered depend on the personality of the discoverer, as we shall briefly show, but very often the so-called "wish" is no wish at all. Thus, for example, Dr. Groddeck (quoted by Dr. Stromme, *Psyche and Eros*, 2: 158.) reports that he invariably got a pain in the left foot when he set out to call on a patient he did not like and that the pain disappeared at once if he made it clear to himself that he got the pain as an admonition not to show his antipathy. Now, wherein was this the fulfilment of a repressed wish? Has Dr. G. completely forced all his kindly impulses out of consciousness? Besides, most psychoanalysts would have said Dr. G. got the pain so as to have an excuse for not calling on the patient. I would say that he got the pain because the idea of going to that patient was painful to him. (In Americanese we would say, "that patient gave him a pain.") A patient suffering from a neurosis may put his symptoms to such use as he chooses or as the circumstances will permit; but this is a very different thing from saying that the patient begot the symptom or neurosis for the purpose of putting it to that use. So Dr. G. might have used his pain as a means of getting out of his call, or staying home to read an interesting book, or to be sympathetic to his patient. Professor Bleuler, in his interesting little monograph on "autistic thinking" cites the case, whether actual or only hypothetical I do not know, of a patient who wished

(Query: consciously or unconsciously?) his rival—a certain Mr. Stout—to die and who thereupon went in for a stupidly exaggerated weight reduction cure and thus killed Mr. Stout in his own person. Presumably the wish-fulfilment here is the destruction of Mr. Stout in effigy; but most psychoanalysts would say that the patient is being punished (by his unconscious) for having wished Stout's death. The only objection to this is that the patient may have wanted and enjoyed his obesity cure. As for me—I would like to have a talk with the patient.

An important question must now be considered, viz.: under what circumstances does an idea become transformed into a somatization phenomenon? The answer to this question can only be hinted at on this occasion. Silberer's brilliant work on the autosymbolic phenomenon, one of the most valuable fruits of psychoanalytic psychology, has taught us that autosymbolization occurs if a person is trying to think while he is in the hypnagogic or hypnopompic state, i. e., between sleeping and waking. Somewhat on the same principle, I would say, that a somatization occurs if a person is confronted with an idea while he is in what Breuer has called the "hypnoid state." By this I mean an emotional state during which an individual cannot for the moment think rationally, logically, realistically. The individual is suddenly confronted with an unexpected idea which he is not prepared to deal with in a normal manner. This is especially apt to be the case if the idea is a painful one, or one which the individual feels himself incapable of dealing with adequately, or if the new idea (not necessarily painful in itself) is out of harmony or inconsistent with the individual's

other ideas. But it may also be brought about after an individual has brooded a long time on an idea or state of affairs in whose presence he feels himself helpless as far as action on his part is concerned. Mental and physical fatigue, distraction, intense preoccupation, somnolence, etc., predispose to the occurrence of somatizations. Such conversions need not necessarily occur at the time of the original incidence of the traumatic experience; its mere recollection during the hypnoid state at any time after the traumatic experience may evoke a somatization phenomenon.

Not all the symptoms of a psychoneurosis are somatizations of ideas. Many of the symptoms are reactions to, defences against or elaborations of somatizations. Many instances of psychoneurosis have nothing to do with the process of somatization but are the manifestation of an unsettled mental state resulting from business worries, fear of failure, the fear of social ostracism, an unsatisfactory love life, etc. Overwork and insufficient rest may make a person nervous, i. e., irritable and shaky, but they cannot cause a psychoneurosis. A psychoneurosis is invariably due to intense emotional disturbance in persons who find themselves in what they consider a hopeless situation.

Freud maintains that in every case of psychoneurosis an inadequate sexual life can be demonstrated. But experience has convinced me that psychoneuroses occur even in persons whose sexual lives are normal, satisfactory and adequate, and, on the other hand, that persons may lead very unsatisfactory sexual lives and not develop psychoneuroses. The surrounding circumstances are more important than the sexual life. Mrs. A was never a very healthy woman and did not



lead a normal sexual life, but her neurosis broke out only after she discovered proofs of her husband's infidelity and when she feared to lose him. Till then no one would have said she was suffering from a psychoneurosis. To say that her conversion hysteria was due to her injured narcissism and was consequently a "sexual" disease in the Freudian sense, would be characteristic psychoanalytic verbal legerdemain.

A few words on how Mrs. A was cured will not be out of place. As a result of our talks she learned the truth about the rôle that sex plays in the lives of normal men and women, learned where she had fallen short in this regard and how much she had contributed to alienating her husband from her. This knowledge enabled her to come to a decision with respect to her conduct in the future as well as to an understanding with her husband. Fortunately, he really loved her and was willing to co-operate with her in making the balance of their married life a success. Had he not been willing to do this, no amount of analysis and understanding would have done her any appreciable good. Feeling her position secure, and trusting herself and her husband to do all in their power to make each other happy, cured her of her insomnia, her fear, depression and feebleness, and gave birth to a new desire to live and "make good." The numbness and choking sensation disappeared when she understood their "significance."

Was she cured for ever? Yes, as far as the above symptoms are concerned, if her husband continues to love her, be true to her and consider her wishes, and if she will continue to be the kind of wife he wants.

The preceding paragraphs might be construed to imply that I advised Mrs. A to indulge her husband in desires which were repugnant to her. This would be doing me an injustice. I never advised her anything directly; I limited myself to telling her the truth about the sexual life as about anything else that came up for discussion. How such knowledge influences a person's conduct depends altogether upon what he intends to accomplish, his life-goal. It was left to her to decide whether she would pay a certain price for happiness or not. She never told me what her decision was as to her conduct in the future, but in the light of what she reported in *Session 9* (*Cf. Psyche and Eros*, 2: 132, col. 1.) we know what her decision was. All instruction and all explanation imply advice. Freudians write lengthily and abstrusely against giving patients advice. Theoretically and in print this is all right; but in practise it does not work out. And, as a matter of fact, one has only to read the clinical reports of the psychoanalysts to see that they do give advice. Thus, for example, Freud himself reports (*A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, p. 58.) that he had "forbidden" a patient of his to telephone to his fiancée. If to forbid a person to do something in an important matter is not at least equivalent to advising him, language has lost all meaning. Stekel's case reports teem with advice to his patients and so do Pfister's and others'. I have no hesitation in advising my patients when I think I am in fairly full possession of the relevant facts.

The more thorough discussion of the many problems opened by this paper must be reserved for the future.

## REVIEWS

**MOLL, DR. ALBERT:**—Okkultismus u. Psychologie. *Zeitschrift f. Psychotherapie u. med. Psychologie.* Vol. 8; No. 1 and 2.

Moll is utterly incredulous as to mediums. He is of the opinion that some of the mediums are victims of mental disease. Credulous occultists regard the hallucinations of these mentally diseased individuals as the miraculous utterances of spirits. He has never succeeded in obtaining objective proof of the appearances or phenomena claimed by the spiritualists. "These mediums find all sorts of silly excuses for refusing to submit to scientific tests." Notwithstanding this, Moll thinks that these phenomena ought to be submitted to scientific tests, in spite of the obstacles that fanatical occultists put in the way of such investigations.

I know nothing personally about occultism, but I subscribe to Moll's view that the subject ought to be studied experimentally until it can be determined "whether at least some scrap of all this material may finally prove to be due to hitherto unknown forces." I have elsewhere warned the public against the dangers of a spiritualistic epidemic, especially as this may affect neurotic persons who meddle with this subject. But physicians and psychologists ought to take seriously the evidence submitted by Schrenck-Notzing. No honest thinker ought to reject something a priori just because it doesn't fit into his established theories and convictions. There may be in us psychic powers which we do not

yet suspect. I consider all these psychic marvels as emanations of the ego. As regards these things many marvels may be in store for us.

Stekel. (T.).

**SCHRENCK—NOTZING, DR. A.:**  
—Physicalische Phenomena des Mediumismus. Studien zur Erforschung telekinetischer Vorgänge. [Physical Phenomena of Mediumism. A study of Telekinetic Processes.] Muenchen (E. Reinhardt.), 1920.

The conflict that Schrenck-Notzing started with his book *Phenomena of Materialisation* [which can now be had in an English translation] is not yet ended and already the indefatigable author presents us with a new book intended to prove the occurrence of these physical phenomena. The subject matter treated of is what he calls telekinetic processes, i. e., the question of the possibility of exerting force through space so as to beget motion in a distant place, e. g., causing a table to rise, or elevating a pair of scissors without touching them. The book is illustrated with numerous photographs and tables in which the miracle of the soul's power to generate force is objectively shown. Most of these relate to the experiments of Prof. Ochrowsicz of Warsaw with the medium Stanislaw Tomczyk. The author also draws on some of the material to be found in English literature and even the discredited Eusapia Paladino is referred to. A photograph shows us a mandolin floating in the air; another photograph shows us a small table with an accordion on it



rising in the air. I have no inclination to believe in spiritualism or to take seriously the comical manifestations of the "spirits." I agree, however, with Moll that these matters should be investigated. There may possibly be within us unsuspected forces which may undergo transformation from the psychical into the physical-materialisation phenomena of the living soul which spiritualists falsely ascribe to spirits. Possibly! I would be grateful to the spiritualists as well as to Schrenck-Notzing if they gave me the opportunity to study these phenomena under scientific conditions. On one of these photographs we see fine threads to which something like a pudding is attached. [This may be the so-called ectoblast.] These threads seem to be finer than any hair or silk thread. The author furnishes us with several explanations but none of them satisfies me. The future will show us how much value is to be attached to these experiments. We ought to offer a prize for a good medium and another prize for an objective scientist to study these phenomena. Then only would we be in a position to choose between Dessoir and Schrenck-Notzing.

Stekel. (T.).

LIEPMANN, DR. W.:—*Psychologie der Frau. Versuch einer synthetischen, sexual-psychologischen Entwicklungslehre in Zehn Vorlesungen.* [The Psychology of Woman. An attempt at a synthetic, sexual-psychologic theory of evolution. 10 lectures.] Berlin, Vienna: Urban & Schwarzenberg, 1920.

Liepmann attempts to explain the soul of woman from an evolutionary point of

view. In this he has brilliantly succeeded. Proceeding from the biological bases of the sexual instinct he reaches a beautifully spiritualistic analysis of our erotism. In his eyes marriage is a biologic unity and a step to a more advanced humanity. "The instinct is a resolute leap into the dark; the choice is the forward-looking wish for light." When he speaks of marriage he is a scientist as well as a poet. It is for him the holy sacrament which, in reality, signifies a carnated espousal of universal nature. Motherhood he regards as the crown of life. The whole work is permeated with the doctrine of restraint and the force that leads mankind away from itself to higher things. This splendid work contains a series of intensely interesting confessions from his pupils and other women who listened to his lectures. Physicians and all cultured persons will find the book interesting and delightful reading. Because of its literary charm and wealth of thoughts, as well as because of its attractive make-up, Liepmann's book is one of the most significant publications of last year.

Stekel. (T.).

FREIMARK, HANS:—*Die Revolution als psychologische Massenerscheinung. Historisch-psychologische Studie.* [Revolution as a manifestation of Crowd-psychology. A historical and psychological study.] Munich and Wiesbaden: I. F. Bergmann, 1920.

The author offers us a splendid account of revolution as a mass phenomenon. The impelling thoughts of revolutions are deailed and revolutions are portrayed as necessities. By virtue of his wide reading and his fine thinking

powers he shows us how revolutions came about and why they had to come. He hoped that there might be in Germany a transforming power which would ultimately make itself manifest as a crowd phenomenon and bring about a new Germany. Let us hope that his wish may be fulfilled. His book will unquestionably supply physicians with much food for thought and will explain many otherwise obscure phenomena of national and international import. Crowd psychology is one of the most important and interesting chapters in the psychology of mankind. Very few writers have yet noted the fact that the reactions and behavior of the crowd mind resemble those of the neurotic.

Stekel. (T.).

KISCH, DR. ADOLF:—Sexuelle u. Alkoholfrage. Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiete der Sexualforschung. [Sexuality and Alcohol.] Marcus & Weber. 1920.

That alcohol has injurious effects on the sexual glands is generally known. Kisch tells us nothing new when he describes the wretchedness of families cursed by drunkenness. All his claims and demands may be subscribed to unreservedly. That Germany's re-birth would be facilitated by restricting the use of alcohol there may be admitted even by one who disapproves of the extreme measures emanating from the American legislators in this regard. Alcohol in the shape of beer and light wines is one of the necessary pleasures of mankind. Stronger drinks, such as cognac, whiskey, etc., should be prohibited. One who has seen the disgusting wastefulness and orgies of the war profiteers in various countries will approve of all that

our author says. The action of America in this regard, though it is unpopular and extreme, is a great step forward. Russia's experience is also a strong argument for the prohibition of alcoholic drinks.

Stekel. (T.).

CARUS, PAUL:—Eros and Psyche. A Fairy-Tale of Ancient Greece. Retold after Apuleius. Illustrations by Paul Thumann. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., pp. xviii, 101.

This legend of love, after which our journal, with a transposition in the order of the names and of their importance, has been named, is the only Greek fairy-tale which has come down to us. It has been preserved only in the version of the Latin writer of the second century and is included in his strange romance, "*The Golden Ass*," best known to English readers in William Addington's translation (1566) which appeared in a new edition, with an introduction by the late Charles Whibley, in 1893. In the version of the late Paul Carus an effort has been made to bring out the religious and philosophical aspects and the text is accompanied by a great number of vignettes, in addition to the beautiful full-page illustrations by Paul Thumann. The Freudians, it will be remembered, look upon fairy-tales, and folk-lore in general, as realised wishes of humanity in its childhood, formulated into permanent form.

R.

UPPVALL, AXEL JOHAN:—August Strindberg: A Psychoanalytic Study, with Special Reference to the Oedipus Complex. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1920. 95 pages.

The book under review, a Clark University dissertation in psychology, which originally appeared in *Post Lore*, is an attempt at an interpretation of Strindberg's complex personality from the Freudian point of view or in terms of the Oedipus Complex. This idea is not original with the author. Among the writers who preceded him in this field may be mentioned Dr. S. Rahmer, who published, in 1907, his brief monograph, *August Strindberg: Eine pathologische Studie*, in the Munich series "Grenzfragen der Literatur und Medizin."

This dissertation is an unselfish act without parallel in the history of literary criticism. The author is interpreting the complex character of his countryman in the light of Freud's Theory of Sex for Freudians, while to him Strindberg must remain an unsolved problem, since he expressly stresses the fact in the Preface that he does not accept the Freudian theories and is far from subscribing to the teachings of the School of Vienna. This reminds us of a college debating team, which often takes a stand opposed to its own views merely for the sake of mental or rhetorical gymnastics. We wonder why the author did not select for his dissertation a subject more in conformity with his own views. His book raises the psychological question as to whether or not a writer can convince others when he himself is not convinced.

Dr. Uppvall makes no mention of Strindberg's short play *Lucifer*, which throws great light on his sociological as well as theological views and which is of paramount importance to the understanding of his mentality.

Withal the book contains many good

points, among which the quoted passages do not occupy the lowest rank.

There is a very suggestive bibliography at the end of the book.

R.

GOURMONT, REMY DE:—Philosophic Nights in Paris: Being Selections From *Promenades Philosophiques*. Translated by Isaac Goldberg. Boston: John W. Luce & Company, 1920, 8 vo., 193 pages.

Remy de Gourmont, perhaps the most striking and daring of modern French thinkers, is of especial interest to students of psychoanalysis. It is generally known that this versatile writer was not only a poet, novelist, literary critic, philosopher, philologist, biologist, but also a psychologist of no mean rank, but it is not so well known that his psychological views show striking analogies to psychoanalytic theories. This is a most interesting phenomenon in view of the fact that he never mentions Freud and his school, and Remy de Gourmont is always frank about his sources. As a writer has recently pointed out in *The Dial*, the Freudian viewpoint about the dignity of sex finds a beautiful expression in this Frenchman's book *L'Amour physique*, which we should so much wish to see in an English translation. The following aphorism from the book under review ought to make Mr. Theodore Schroeder's heart glad: "Religions turn madly about sexual questions."

R.

PAPPENHEIM, DR. M.:—Ueber einen Fall von Kleiderfetichismus seltener Art. [An unusual case of Clothing Fetichism.] *Zeitschr. f. Sexualwissenschaft*, Dec., 1920.



Pappenheim describes a man who had the irresistible urge to steal hats and men's belts and who had several times incurred the penalty of the law because of this impulse. In his room the police found nine velour hats, a cigarette case and other stolen objects.

The man's sexual life showed definite homosexual traits. Though he derives no great pleasure from homoerotic activities (because of internal inhibitions), he cannot help approaching men and rubbing up against them; sexual excitement accompanies these acts. Although he can afford to buy whatsoever he wants he loves to wear clothing that had been worn by others (in all probability because of the aroma of other men clinging to them,—the mechanism of *displacement-substitution* or *Verladung*—, especially such articles as come with belts. The sight of a soft hat in a person's coat-pocket causes palpitation and erection. "Seeing a person struggling to take his hat or a belt out of his pocket causes a painful desire to urinate and an emission." A detailed analysis was not attempted.

The author considers the case unique because of the presence of a homosexual component in a case of fetichism. That this is not unusual I pointed out in my essay on fetichism in the *Zentralblatt f. Psch.* (vol. IV, pp. 113-120, 237-269.) There I described the case of a man who used to run after men who had a swollen cheek; a clear instance of homosexual fetichism. Pappenheim's patient also manifested what I have designated and described (*l. c.*) as a "harem cult." Dr. P. will find additional light on his case in my essay on the "roots of kleptomania," where I point out and develop the idea that the stolen objects

have a symbolic value. The hat is a well-known genital symbol. Belts have sexual significance because of the location where they are worn. But a belt may also have reference to what I described as "the Christ neurosis" when I showed the importance of this neurosis in the causation of fetichism. The belt serves as a substitute for the loin cloth.

It is a great pity that a thorough-going analysis of the patient was not undertaken. I shall publish a series of such cases in the sixth volume of my series of books on the "Diseases of the Emotions" and shall show how complicated the mental processes are that result in what we call genuine fetichism.

Stekel. (T.).

KIELHOLZ, DR. A. (*Koenigsfelden*) Jakob Boehme. Ein pathographischer Beitrag zur Psychologie der Mystik. [J. B. A Pathographic Contribution to the Psychology of Mysticism.] *Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde*, No. 17. Leipzig and Vienna (Fr. Deuticke), 1919.

The author has devoted attention and care to his theme. He thinks his analysis warrants him in attributing the work of the great German mystic and inspiration-philosopher chiefly to the following four elements:

1. A purely psychological consideration of all phenomena,—wherein only the processes of the inner self are adequate.

2. A return to childish thinking, a re-awakening of infantile desires, a yearning for the golden days of youth;

3. A repudiation and repression of conscious impulses and a synchronous sexual symbolisation of all occurrences;

4. A sublimation of the infantile

voyeuristic impulse in the specific achievement of the mystic seer.

Such studies are inevitably exposed to the danger of depreciating the analysed subject; one gets the impression that the greatness of any synthetic achievement could be analysed away. Kielholz wisely tries to guard against this error by expressly acknowledging the existence of valuable "positive features" in Boehme's mysticism (as in all mysticism).

Silberer. (T.)

JONES, DR. E. (London):—The Theory of Symbolism. *The Brit. J. of Psychology*, IX, part 2, Oct., 1918. Cambridge.

I discussed this essay by Jones at length in *Psyche and Eros*, vol 1, No. 1, pp. 53-57. I consider it worth while mentioning that that discussion dealt with the German version of the essay as printed in the *Internat. Zeitschr. f. ärztl. Psch.*, vol 5, pp. 244 ff. Since then I have received a copy of the original English version and was pleased to note that it deals at considerable length with an aspect of symbolism, viz.: functional symbolism, which I greatly missed in the German version. Although I do not think that Jones's treatment of the subject fell out happily (as to which I probably will have something to say another time), the essay is stimulating and worth reading. If, therefore, one would get a well-rounded idea of Jones's thoughtful work it is absolutely necessary to read the *Journal of Psychology*. It is incomprehensible to me why the *Zeitschrift* printed only an abridgement which gives such an incomplete conception.

Silberer. (T.)

KAMMERER, DR. PAUL—*Ueber Verjüngung u. Verlängerung des persönlichen Lebens*. [Rejuvenation and the Prolongation of Individual Life.] *Stuttgart, Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt*, 1921. Illustrated.

Steinach's researches have kicked up a lot of dust. There was great need for a succinct and comprehensive presentation of his theories and findings. Unfortunately a number of amateurs have attempted to supply this deficiency and have succeeded only in bringing the subject into bad repute or making it ridiculous. It is therefore a cause for great satisfaction that we now have an authoritative presentation of the subject by one of the few persons really competent to deal with it,—we mean Dr. Paul Kammerer, the well-known Viennese physiologist, who was associated with Dr. Steinach in his laboratory and is thoroughly acquainted with the subject by virtue of his own researches. The value of this book is increased by the fact that the experiments on human beings are regarded from the general biological point of view and are contrasted with what we know of plants and animals. In this connection we may also refer to the author's earlier book, *Geschlechtsbestimmung u. Geschlechtsverwandlung* [Sex-Determination and Sex Transformation], Vienna, 1918 (Moritz Perles).

H. Silberer. (T.)

GRODDECK, DR. GEORG—*Der Seelensucher. Ein psychoanalytischer Roman*. [The Soul Searcher. A Psychoanalytic Romance.] Vienna: Internat. psych. Verlag, 1921; 4to, boards, pp. 314.

The sub-title would lead us to expect a narrative of profound psychic insight. But neither the insight nor the social seriousness which one would assume to

be at the basis of a psychoanalytic romance are borrowed from *psa.*; the author presents his readers with the filth, the sweepings from the innermost recesses of the soul. This unappetizing matter, in which the enemies of *psa.* see, falsely enough, the essence of *psa.*—is here made the main theme, as if it had been the author's intention to make *psa.* ridiculous,—although this is impossible for the author is himself a psychoanalyst.

A more happy utilization of the grotesque style which the author seems purposely to have chosen might perhaps have met with better success; but his purpose has succeeded so little that we find ourselves in the presence of a piece of work that has neither psychological nor literary value.

H. Silberer. (T.)

TISCHNER, DR. RUDOLF—*Ueber Telepathie u. Hellsehen*. [Telepathy and Clairvoyance.] Munich: J. F. Bergmann, 1920; Four tables and seventeen illustrations.

It would be desirable to have the disputed matters of telepathy and clairvoyance at last definitely cleared up. The problems involved are in many respects delicate. It is easy to dispose of the matter with a shrug of the shoulders, and it is equally easy to accept everything uncritically, as many have repeatedly been charged with doing. But by this method we are not brought one step nearer the truth. Only serious, painstaking work and cautious investigation can serve the purpose. And every time that such a book as this is published it ought to be acknowledged in the name of objective science, irrespective of whether the achievement carries us forward much or only little; for a sudden achievement, calculated to satisfy all critics, is hardly to be expected. The

book now before us offers us notable material, critical as well as positive, and is deserving of praise because of a certain clearness in its method. We may speak of it as consisting of three parts: 1. an introduction dealing with the history of the subject, with the arguments pro and con, with the difficulties inherent in the study, etc.; 2. the detailed report of the experiments, and 3. a theoretical portion. By *telepathy* the author means, quite correctly, the transference of sensations, ideas, etc., from one person to another without the aid of our known senses. Clairvoyance must be clearly distinguished from this. In his introduction Tischner gives the following sub-divisions or varieties of clairvoyance:

1. Cryptoscopy, i. e., the ability to see invisible, concealed objects that are near;

2. Seeing what is remote in space, i. e., having cognition of objects and processes that are so far from the person that they are not accessible to his senses, so that the knowledge must be obtained by extra—or super-sensory (parasensory) means;

3. Seeing what is remote in time (past or future). This last group seems furthest removed from anything scientific, yet it must be formulated conceptually.

The best part of Tischner's introduction is his discussion of the prejudices and reproaches with which telepathy has been approached; among the believers in telepathy he mentioned among others, the distinguished American philosopher, William James. The second part of the book reports the experiments, those that failed as well as those that were successful,—certainly a great im-



provement over reporting only selected experiments. In contrast to Chowrin Tischner makes every effort not to confuse telepathy with clairvoyance. For this he must be given credit; but in one series of experiments he seems not to have excluded the possibility of a hyperesthesia of the sense organs (which plays the chief rôle in Chowrin's work) in a convincing manner; one cannot be too painstaking in the precautionary measures employed. It is true, of course, that the experimenter must accommodate himself to the conditions under which the fine and delicate psychic apparatus of the subject is capable of functioning; but there are ways of increasing the value of the results obtained and of adapting oneself to the strict and unobjectionable methods of scientific investigation. I do not mean to say that the author has not taken the pains to do this, but he has fallen far short of Chowrin whose work may be taken as a model in this regard. Our author also deceives himself as to the degree of certainty with which he has excluded telepathic influences in his clairvoyance experiments, but it would take us too far afield to demonstrate this in detail. Notwithstanding this, the book has much to offer us that is instructive. The most convincing section is that which deals with the clairvoyant powers of Miss von B. who is capable of deciphering unseen visiting cards chosen at random from among a large number and properly covered up, and who is capable of reproducing even the peculiarities of the handwriting! The third part of the book, on the contrary, is very weak and philosophically assailable. The author's "psychistic theory" and his idea of "something psychic traversing space"

constitute altogether too vague an hypothesis.

H. Silberer. (T.)

CHORWIN, DR. A. N.—*Experimentelle Untersuchungen auf dem Gebiete des räumlichen Hellsehens (Der Cryptoscopy u. inadäquaten Sinneserregung.)* [Experimental Studies of Spatial Clairvoyance, Cryptoscopy and Inadequate Sense Excitation.] Munich: E. Reinhardt, 1919.

This book consists of a series of papers which were originally published (1899) by their author, Dr. Chowrin, (chief physician to the insane asylum in Tarnobrow,) in the pages of a Russian magazine devoted to medical psychology, and entitled "a rare form of hyperesthesia of the higher sense organs." The papers are based on a series of experiments with a thirty-two year old female hysteric. This woman came from a very neurotic family. Since her twenty-sixth year she has been afflicted with hystericepilepsy. Miss M., the subject, is an intelligent school teacher but, owing to her illness, she has had to give up teaching from time to time. In the present connection it is important to note that she suffered from anesthesia and hyperesthesia of the skin, and also from anesthesia of the left half of the body, not merely of the skin, but also of the higher sense organs, and, in contrast with this, an exaggerated sensibility in the right half of the body. The phenomena dealt with are such as have long engaged the attention of occultists and, unfortunately, have been dealt with so uncritically that the matter has fallen into disrepute. There has also come about an utter confusion of concepts, so that clairvoyance (in space and time), cryptoscopy, and telepathy are wholly in-

distinguishable from one another. In this regard the most valuable contributions to the subject are those to be found in the reports of the experiments conducted by the English and American Society for Psychical Research, even though these contributions are not all of equal value.

The German editor of this book, Dr. Schrenck-Notzing, declares, not without right, that Chowrin's significance lies in the methodic exactness of his study, in the variations introduced into his experiments, in his progressive evolution from simple to complicated tasks, and finally in his intelligent treatment, education and control of the subject experimented upon. It was by chance that he became aware of the girl's powers when he found that she could feel the contents of a letter without opening it, etc. Such phenomena, presented in this crude form are scientifically worthless, no matter how interesting they may be. Therefore Dr. Chowrin began a series of systematic experiments to study the girl's powers more carefully. He found that she was able to read sealed writings even after the most exacting (and convincing) precautions had been taken to prevent fraud. To be able to read writings so carefully secured and wrapped, Miss M. had to get into a state of intense concentration. She touched the object, felt it, fingered it and even pressed it against her forehead. After a considerable interval, often only after several attempts, the knowledge of the written letters or words came to her or she saw in a hallucinatory way the content, the meaning of the thing written. It was a happy idea on the part of Dr. Chowrin to write a few sentences on a photographic film; had the subject opened the envelope even for the hundredth of a second this would have proved her fraudulent char-

was also capable, even when blindfolded, of recognizing colors and deciphering written matter, even though these were carefully wrapped up, apparently with her fingers. In the color experiments, it is noteworthy, that the colors at first gave rise to characteristic tactile sensations, e. g., rough, smooth, etc., as well as to temperature sensations and that only afterwards did they beget the optical hallucination appropriate to the particular color involved. But the reader must not think that the tactile sensations were brought about by putting colored objects into Miss M's hands directly and letting her infer the colors from the consistency, etc., of the objects. No, indeed! Lights of different colors were permitted to play on her hands, or little tubules containing colored objects were placed in her hands or put into sealed boxes in which her hands were encased and in darkness.

Chowrin and his associates come to the conclusion that they were dealing with a case of hyperesthesia of some sense organs, especially the visual and the tactile. He seems to be somewhat averse to leave the narrow domain of physiology, perhaps because of the doubtful reputation of the occult. But we must not deny that Chowrin has not proved beyond cavil that the cryptoscopic phenomena he reports are the results of an hyperesthesia; the possibility is still there, though he does not consider it, that they are due to a perception of a peculiar nature,—a possibility which must nowadays (when even telepathy is receiving scientific consideration) be borne in mind. And he has also almost wholly failed to exclude the co-operation of telepathic influences. Dr. Schrenck-Notzing has recognized this and pointed it out in detail. But, for all this, these experiments—as reported in this volume—are amongst the most

## CURRENT LITERATURE

*A Psychological Study of Some Mental Defects in the Normal Dull Adolescent—*

By L. P. Clark, M. D. (New York).  
Medical Record (N. Y.), June 11th,  
1921 (99:991-996).

*Le idee di Sigmund Freud sulla sessualita—*

By Prof. Roberto Assagioli. Rassegna di Studi Sessuali, Mar.-Apr., 1921; 1:60-68. [An uncritical resumé of Freud's sexual theories.]

*Die sexuelle Anomalien—*

[Sexual Anomalies.] By J. Kirschhoff. Frankfort a. m.: Osw. Quass, 1921; 8 vo, p. 132.

*Die homoerotik in der griechischen Literatur—*

[Homoerotism in Greek Literature.] By Hans Licht, Bonn: A. Marcus & E. Weber; pp. 78; M. 12.50.

*Nail Biting—*

By J. C. Warbrick, M. D. (Chicago) Western Medical Times (Denver), June, 1921; 40:361-363. [People bite their fingers, suck their thumbs, stroke their beards, etc., "because they want to do it." Brilliant discovery!]

*The Nervous Patient from the Viewpoint of the Vegetative Neurologist—*

By Ed. H. Reede, M. D. (Washington, D. C.); N. Y. Med. Journ., June 15, 1921; 113:853-859. [Interesting.]

*The Heart Doctor of Greenwich Village. Our new Menace—*

[i. e., the lay analyst.] By Mr. James Henle. McCall's Magazine, June, 1921. [Stupid even for a lay Journal.]

*Klinische Beiträge zur Psa—*

[Clinical Contributions to Psa.] By Dr. Karl Abraham (Vienna); Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag; Leipzig, Wien, Zürich, 1921; large 8 vo, pp. 303. [28 essays written between 1907 and 1920; typically Freudian.]

*Dreams that Come from Afar—*

By H. A. Bruce; Pictorial Review, (N. Y.), June, 1921.

*The Moral Center in the Brain—*

(Cortical Region for Control of Morals.) Its Location and Significance. By Wm. Browning, M. D. (Brooklyn, N. Y.). Medical Record, June, 18 and June 25, 1921; 99:1043-1048, 1089-1094. [A scholarly and well-considered attempt at locating a moral center in the right frontal lobe in right-minded people. Morality being a purely relative term, we cannot believe in a moral centre.]

*Manifestations of Hysteria—*

By Dr. H. Carlill. The Lancet, May 21, 1921.

*Multiple Sclerosis and Psychoanalysis. A Preliminary Statement of a Tentative Research—*

By Dr. S. E. Jelliffe. Amer. J. of the Medical Sciences, May, 1921.



*Obsessions about Being Deformed—*

By Dr. J. S. Van Teslaar (Brookline, Mass.); *The Med. Critic and Guide* (N. Y.), July, 1921; 24:267-272.

*A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis—*

By Prof. Sigmund Freud, LL.D.; Authorized Translation with a Preface [3 pages] by G. Stanley Hall. New York: Boni & Liveright, 1920. 8 vo, cloth, pp. X-406. [Note the equivocal title-page! The printing is bad, the translation worse.]

*How Science Makes It Possible for You to Meet and Know Your Successful Self—*

By Wm. MacHarg and W. Lay, Ph. D. (Illustrated by L. A. Miller.) *Cosmopolitan*, Sept., 1921; 71:53-57. [Typically journalese; full of misleading and false statements.]

*Narcolepsy—*

By Somer. Wiener *klin. Wochenschrift*, Mar. 31, 1921.

*Post-War Neurosis—*

By S. Herbert. *The Lancet*, June 11, 1921.

*Some Emotional Reactions in Epileptics.*

By L. P. Clark, M. D. *N. Y. Medical Journal*, June 1, 1921; 113:785-789. [The epileptic suffers from an essential poverty of emotions, a quantitative and qualitative defect in the instincts (especially the adaptive instincts), which are more frequently perverted than fully arrested.]

*Singultus—*

By H. S. de Brun, M. D. (N. Y.) *id.*, 789-793. ["Hysterical singultus usually attacks a person who is men-

tally inferior." (Not true.) "It frequently comes on when a patient attempts to make an intolerable situation tolerable. . . . also in epilepsy and hysteria."]

*Report of a Case of Hysterical Aphagia*

By A. A. Rutz, M. D. (Brooklyn, N. Y.). *id.*, 793-796. [An interesting case, treated by suggestion; cured itself.]

*Shaker Celibacy and Salacity Psychologically Interpreted—*

By Mr. Th. Schroeder (Cos Cob, Conn.). *id.*, 800-805. ["All mysticism is a means of supreme exaltation, needed to neutralize a feeling of inferiority which is founded upon erotic emotional disturbances." Interesting and convincing. Reprints.]

*The Sex Complex—*

A Study of the Relationships of the Internal Secretions to the Female Characteristics and Functions in Health and Disease. By W. B. Bell, M. D. (Lond.), New York: Wm. Wood & Co., 1921; \$6.00.

*The Nervous Child—*

By Professor C. W. Burr, (Phila. Pa). *N. Y. Med. Journal*, Aug. 17, 1921; 114:205-209. [Hostile to psychoanalysis—and unfairly so.]

*Psychoses and Potential Psychoses of Childhood—*

By E. A. Stecker, M. D. (Phila., Pa.) *id.*, 209-211.

*The Problems of Personality in Disease—*

By Marion E. Kenworthy, M. D. (N. Y.). *Id.*, 211-214. [Interesting and well written.]

*Personality in the Making—*

By Mr. W. H. Grossman (Plainfield, N. J.). *Id.*, 215-223.

*Children's Fears—*

By Frances Russ-Barker (Lond.). *Id.*, 229-230.

*Das Geschlechtsleben der Hysterischen.*

Eine medizinische, soziologische u. forensische Studie. [The Sexual Life of the Hysteric. A medical, legal and sociologic study.] By Placzek, M. D. (Berlin). Bonn: A. Marcus & E. Weber, 1919; pp. 264.

*The Arrest and Cure of Dementia Praecox—*

By B. Holmes, M. D. (Chicago, Ill.) *Medical Record* (N. Y.), Aug. 16, 1921; 100:231-234. [Sets up the theory that D. P. is the product of toxins produced in the cecum and can be cured by local treatment, surgical and medical. Unproven.]

*Psychogenic and Neurogenic Factors in Skin Diseases—*

By M. Scholtz, M. D. (Los Angeles, Cal.) *Id.*, 234-236.

*The Psychic Factor in Exophthalmic Goiter—*

By I. Bram, M. D., *Journal of the Amer. Med. Ass'n.*, July 23, 1921.

*Religiose Stroemungen im Judentum Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Chassidismus—*

[Religious currents in Judaism, with special reference to Chassidism.] By Dr. S. A. Horodetzky. Bern, Leipzig: Ernst Bircher, 1920.

*Les principes de la psychologie de la religion et la psychanalyse—*

[The principles of psychology, religion and psa.] By Maurice Neesser. Neuchatel, 1920, *Leçon d'ouverture*.

*Le sentiment filial et la religion—*

[Filial sentiment and religion.] By P. Bovet. *Revue de Théologie et de philosophie*, Nr. 36. Lausanne, Augt., 1920.

*Der psychologische u. biologische Hintergrund des Expressionismus—*

[The psychological and biological basis of expressionism.] By O. Pfister. Bern: E. Bircher, 1920.

*La psychoanalyse et l'éducation—*

By Dr. P. Bovet, 1920.

*Sexualethik des Communismus—*

[Sexual ethics of communism.] By E. Friedländer. Vienna: Verlagsgesellschaft "Neue Erde", 1920.

*The Logic of the Unconscious Mind—*

By M. K. Bradby. London: H. Frowde (Oxford Univ. Press), 1920; pp. XVI-316; \$6.40.

*The Croonian Lectures on the Psychology of the Special Senses and their Functional Disorders—*

By Dr. A. F. Hurst. New York: Ox. Univ. Press, 1920; pp. X-123; \$5.00.

*The Form and Functions of the Central Nervous System. An Introduction to the Study of Nervous Diseases.*

By Dr. F. Tilney. New York: Paul B. Hoeber, 1921; pp. XXIV-1020.

*The Practice of Psycho-Analysis—*

By Dr. C. P. Oberndorf. N. Y. State J. of Medicine, March, 1921; 21: 95-99.

*The Relation of the Persistent Thymus Gland to Criminology—*

By Dr. S. J. Morris (Morgantown, Va.). *Medical Record* (N. Y.), March 12, 1921; 99: 438-439.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

- Sex for Parents and Teachers.* By Wm. L. Stowell, M. D.. 8vo, cloth, pp. 20-204. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1921; \$3.00. Illustrated. [Incomplete, untruthful, puritanical, narrow-minded,—unworthy of its publishers.]
- Anxiety Hysteria: Modern Views on Some Neuroses.* By C. H. L. Rixon, M. D. and Dr. D. Matthew; with a Foreword by Col. Sir A. L. Webb. 12 mo, cloth, pp. 11-24. New York: Paul B. Hoeber, 1921; \$1.50. Portrait. [Written from the non-psychoanalytic, i. e. non-sexual, viewpoint.]
- Autoerotic Phenomena in Adolescence: An Analytical Study of the Psychology and Psychotherapy of Onanism.* By K. Menzies. With a Foreword by Dr. E. Jones. 12 mo, cloth, pp. 8-100. Second Edition. New York: P. B. Hoeber, 1921; \$1.50. [A fairly complete presentation of the subject from the orthodox psychoanalytic viewpoint.]
- Psycho-Analysis: The Key to Human Behavior.* By Mr. Wm. J. Fielding, (Newark, N. J.). Edited by E. Haldebrand-Julius. 32 mo, wrappers, pp. 107. Girard (Kansas): Appeal to Reason; 25 cents. [Thoroughly misleading, full of errors and badly printed.]
- Psycho-Analysis and the War Neuroses.* By Drs. S. Ferenczi, Karl Abraham, Ernest Simmel and Ernest Jones. Introduction by Prof. Sigm. Freud. Large 8 vo, cloth, pp. 59. London, Vienna, New York: The International Psycho-Analytical Press, 1921; 7s. 6d. net. [A fine specimen of book-making.]
- Addresses on Psycho-Analysis.* By J. J. Putnam, M. D. With a Preface by Sigm. Freud, M. D., LL. D. Obituary by Dr. E. Jones. Portrait. Large 8 vo, cloth, pp. 9-470. London, Vienna, New York: The Internat. Psa. Press, 1921; 12s. 6d. net. [22 essays. A fine book and worthy memorial to the "Dean of American Neurologists".]
- Psycho-Analysis: A Brief Account of the Freudian Theory.* By Barbara Low. Introduction by Ernest Jones, M. D. 8 vo, cloth, pp. 199. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920.
- Der Seelenspiegel. Das enoptische Moment in Okkultismus.* [The Mirror of the Soul. The enoptric factor in Occultism.] By Herbert Silberer. 8 vo, wrappers, pp. 58. 1 Table. Pfulingen i. Württ.: Johannes Baum, Verlag, 1921; M. 2.40. [A finely-reasoned and scholarly work.]